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Summary
One of the greatest security threats that we face today is malwares like
worms and viruses. But as current defenses against malwares are fast ap-
proaching their limits, we propose a new behavioral approach to combat
this threat.
This thesis attempts to study the feasibility of detecting malwares based on
behaviors and forms the basis of a new behavior-based detection system.
While the final aim of our research is to study the behaviors of malware,
the scope of this thesis is limit to malware detection. The reason for this
approach is that we believe all malwares share some common behaviors,
and malwares within the same families display more similar behaviors.
We will explore a framework that allows the modeling of high-level be-
haviors from Windows native API system calls. But rather than simply
using sequences of API calls to build behavior signatures like many other
researches, we built semantically rich behavioral signatures based on con-
text provided the system call and reverse engineering based on descriptions
provided by anti-virus companies.
In our analysis, we were successfully in identifying some behaviors common
to all or most of our malware samples, but not to the set of normal applica-
tions used as baseline; thus showing the capability of our system to detect
VIII
IX
for the presence of known malwares and newer malware variants. We were
also able to observe some interesting features of the malwares by studying
the behavioral information provided by the framework.
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Computers today face an onslaught of security threats, from distributed
denial-of-service attacks by botnets, to losing passwords and credit card
information to keystroke loggers. While it seems that a myriad of security
techniques are required to combat these threats, they do have a common
cause: malwares.
Malwares are considered a high priority in the information security sector.
We believe that any improvement in stopping malwares can be very helpful
in slowing down the spread of malwares, thus significantly alleviating the
security threats faced today.
As the current malware detection technology like the anti-virus systems
are fast approaching their limits, we propose a new behavioral approach to
combat this threat.
Rather than to attempt the herculean task of stopping malwares, we just
seek to slow down the propagation. This can be accomplished just by being
1
2able to detect some classes of novel malwares on certain operating systems.
We hope that by understanding malwares based on their behavior, we can
provide another angle of looking at malware threats that can complement
current detection technology.
1.2 Malware Introduction
Malware, or malicious software, is a broad category of software designed
to cause computers to act in a way not authorized by their owners. Two
common classes of malwares will be explored in this thesis based on what
they do and how they spread: viruses and worms.
Viruses and worms have the ability to self-replicate: that is, they can spread
copies of themselves within the infected host, or propagate themselves to
other hosts. The main difference between viruses and worms is that worms
have the ability to spread by themselves. Worms are usually self-contained
and carry the propagation mechanism in addition to the exploits and pay-
loads.
Viruses on the other hand, depend on the hosts to spread themselves. The
most common propagation strategy is for the virus to embed itself in e-mail
as attachment, depending on the recipient to open the viral attachment.
The rate of propagation for these mobile malwares is extremely fast. For ex-
ample, the “Code-Red version 2” worms infected more than 359,000 hosts
in less than 14 hours on July 19, 2001 [8]. It is not inconceivable for a
hacker to be able to form a botnet of hundreds of thousands of infected
hosts within a short period of time.
3The greatest advantage of malwares is their automated, fire-and-forget vec-
tor of attack. That is, the hackers do not need to manually monitor the
malwares they launched. Worms and viruses will spread by themselves;
or be embedded into web pages or trojaned applications, just waiting for
unsuspecting users to download and activate them. Malwares are widely
believed to be the most pressing security concern for most of the Internet
population.
To understand some of the problems caused by malwares, let us take the
example of when a flash worm spreads: the process could take up a large
amount of the network traffic. This could not only affect servers and hosts
so much that legitimate users will experience some degree of denial-of-
service, the wastage of the Internet or network bandwidth is also very
expensive to Internet service providers.
1.3 Current Defense
Currently, the most common form of detection strategy against malwares is
the misuse-signature based approach. This approach presumes any behav-
ior in the knowledge base to be malicious, while any behavior not found in
that knowledge base are presumed to be normal. We have countless anti-
virus systems, spyware hunters, intrusion detection systems and intelligent
firewalls utilizing this pattern-matching defense.
Misuse-signature based systems basically does pattern matching: anti-virus
systems scans files and memory, and network-based intrusion detection sys-
tems scans network packets, for patterns matching known malicious bina-
ries or protocol in its database.
4While anti-virus systems have evolved to include heuristics to detect novel
viruses, and sandboxing to extract the execution behavior of polymorphic
malwares, their basic premise still depends upon a known database of ex-
ploit signatures.
Anomaly-statistical based approach, takes the opposite stance. It presumes
any behavior in the knowledge base to be normal, but the knowledge base
contains trend of past behaviors, as oppose to exact signatures. Any de-
viation from the behaviors in the knowledge base is classified based on
heuristics or probability/statistics, to be abnormal, or possibly malicious.
The greatest strength of misuse-signature based approach is its high prob-
ability of correct threat identification. Compared to anomaly-based sys-
tems, it has a very low rate of false positives. For exact protocol or binary
matches, the intrusion or malware detection is definite, rather than based
on some confidence level.
While some might contend that searching through a large database of sig-
nature is not practical, hashing algorithms enables the matching of events
or binaries to a large number of signatures to be done very efficiently.
The main disadvantage of the misuse-signature system is its inability to
detect unknown threats. It is reactive as any new malwares or exploits
must be captured before signatures can be created for them. The time lag
between getting the malware sample and deployment of created signatures
creates a time window for the new malware to spread. In addition, the
process of signature creation is very labor and knowledge intensive.
51.4 Behavioral Approach
Our behavior-based approach utilizes high-level behaviors for malware de-
tection. The basic assumptions that we made are that all malware have
shared behaviors, and must perform some actions. We will show that it is
possible to detect for the presence of malwares using known behaviors.
Another assumption that we made is that malwares within the same family
share more similarity than with malwares in other family. If this is true,
we will be able to generalize the detection behavior functions to detect
novel variants of a malware family. Our framework will allow for the ver-
ification of this assumption in future work. This is important because if
this assumption does not hold, we will have to explore another malware
classification paradigm based on behavioral similarity to help our system
detect newer malware variants.
While the final aim of our research is to study the behaviors of malware,
the scope of this thesis is limit to malware detection.
1.5 Objectives and Contributions
The objective of this thesis is to show the feasibility of detecting malwares
based on their high-level behaviors. We will explore a framework that can
be used to help us study malware behaviors. In addition, we will show
that the sample malwares shared a number of behaviors, thus showing the
ability of this approach to detect unknown malwares based on behaviors
collected from known malwares. The data collected is semantically rich
enough to allow the identification of known malwares and classification of
malwares based the similarity of their behaviors, as will as flexible enough
to allow statistical analysis on the detected behaviors.
6As this is a proof-of-concept work to explore the framework that can get
quantitative proof, we would like to state the following limitations. We
will explore the potential of this framework with a limited set of sample
malwares and behaviors. The implementation of this work is not in real
time, but via oﬄine analysis.
We will show how we solved a series of problems for this research.
• What malware behaviors to use?
We profiled the behaviors of the more prevalent of malware families
from technical descriptions provided by anti-virus companies.
• What kind of sensor data to use?
We explored various options to get behavioral information from the
system, and finally settled on tracing native level system calls. We
also explored various experimental issues to allow the malwares to
exhibit as many behaviors as possible.
• How to get behaviors from system calls?
We introduce a pattern matching approach to model behaviors from
the system calls, based on the internal workings of Windows and
information gained by studying the system call traces.
• Can behaviors be used to detect known malwares?
We showed that malwares could be detected using certain behavioral
functions. These behaviors appear in the majority of the malwares,
but do not appear in any of the normal applications tested.
• Can behaviors be used to detect novel malwares?
We showed that malware behaviors are composed of basic behavior
blocks that are shared mainly between malware variants of the same
family, and among a small number of malwares in other families. This
7means that it is possible to detect a newer malware variant based on
generalized behaviors.
For this research, we built a database of behavioral signatures collected
from the sample malwares. While some malwares do share the same be-
havioral signatures, this database is growing as more malwares are added
to the experiment. These behavioral signatures combine to form complex
behaviors, or new behaviors not mentioned in the technical descriptions
provided by anti-virus companies. We will introduce these descriptions in
Chapter 4. We believe that a large collection of these behavioral signatures
is vital to help us detect newer malwares.
1.6 Structure of Thesis
This thesis is structured into nine chapters, with the current chapter serv-
ing to introduce the current malware threat and some relevant background
information.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of our behavioral approach, together with
the justifications, advantages and disadvantages. The motivation for the
approach is discussed, followed by the objectives and potential of this work.
Chapter 3 looks at some other research utilizing various kinds of behaviors
for intrusion or malware detection.
In Chapter 4, we first look at the malware behaviors we extracted from
technical descriptions provided by the anti-virus companies. We then per-
form some initial analysis on these behaviors to show that it is feasible to
use behaviors to detect newer malwares.
8Chapter 5 discusses all the experimental issues, from the choice of sensor
to the network configuration.
Chapter 6 explores the methods we use to model high-level behaviors from
system calls.
In Chapter 7, we analyze the behaviors captured from the malware samples.
We showed that it is possible to detect the presence of malwares based on
a small number of complex behaviors, and discuss more about the results.
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the whole thesis into a short conclusion and





The term behavior has a number of different definitions in the area of in-
trusion detection research. For host-based signature-based research like
anti-virus systems, behavior usually means patterns or sequences of in-
structions executed by a binary.
For anomaly-based research, behavior usually means the trend of the sys-
tem’s past profile. But as this area of research is very broad, profile could
mean a different number of things. For example, the behavior of a network-
based intrusion detection system could be the trend of frequency of certain
types of network packets. The behavior of an anomaly-based host IDS
could be the trend of the system’s CPU and memory performance.
Behavior-based detection is significantly different from the general form of
signature-based detection. Most signature-based approach looks for fixed
patterns or regular expressions in payloads, but our behavioral approach
attempts to detect patterns at a much higher level of abstraction.
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A few examples of behaviors in the Windows environment will be given to
illustrate our definition.
• Adding to registry key to start certain program at boot time;
• Copying files;
• Searching directories;
• Listening at certain network ports;
• Connecting to network shares;
• Initiating network connections to multiple hosts.
2.2 Risk Factor
In addition to the behaviors exhibited by malwares, we are also interested
in the risk to normal operations posed by these behaviors. Every action
taken contains an element of risk, as do the existence of any objects like
files or registry keys. To better understand the behaviors of malwares, it
is necessary to quantify the level of risk of each behavior.
Malwares have no risk until activation, thus file execution is riskier than file
creation. Even the location of the file affects the risk factor, as it is more
suspicious to access files in the Windows root directory than the Temporary
directory. Then we have the file names: file names with double extensions
like “See Britney naked.jpg.scr”, or with white spaces between exten-
sions like “Anna Kournikova nude.jpgunionsq unionsq unionsq unionsq unionsq unionsq unionsq unionsq unionsq unionsq unionsqunionsq.exe” are
commonly used by malwares to trick users into activating them.
We also have the risk of information leakage, where the malware contacts
its author to reveal information found within the host. Thus outbound
emails or network connections from new processes are risky; as is searching
for or enumerating information from the local host.
11
As all these threats have different levels of risks, we would also need a
management system to classify and respond to such threats.
2.3 Justification of Approach
If we look at malwares from a software engineering point of view, we can
see that the malware execution process can be decomposed into subgroups
of basic processes, each with simpler objections and behaviors. They can
be viewed as functions to the main program.
Even though the computer is a deterministic machine and has a limited
set of possible behaviors; interaction between programs, other hosts and
users results in a very large set of behaviors. This makes quantifying the
complete set of malware behavior or function very difficult.
While malwares may have large numbers of attack vectors and exploits,
we believe that a lot of the resulting behaviors will be similar. That is,
we believe that a lot of the malwares functions will overlap, even though
current taxonomy places them into different family groups. Therefore, we
believe that functional behaviors of malwares can be used to identify the
presence of malwares in a system. If some of these behavioral functions are
common to a lot group of malwares, they can even be generalized to detect
malwares not seen before.
For example, if we find that most malwares share ten common functions
that does not appear in normal applications, the probability of malware
infection of any programs displaying these ten behavioral characteristics
are very high. As we decrease the number of functions required to signal
infection, the odds of catching a novel infection increases at the expense of
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an increase in false positives.
Unlike anomaly-based systems, we do not claim to be able to detect all
novel attacks.
2.4 Advantages of Approach
2.4.1 Value of Malwares
Hackers are motivated to write malwares for some kind of reward, either
for fun or profit. Therefore, a malware without any purpose has no value.
Malwares, like all other software programs, have very specific purposes.
Viruses and worms are meant to replicate and spread, so the originator
can control more hosts. Hosts that are taken over can be used as launch
pads to attack other machines; or to form part of a botnet, used to launch
distributed denial-of-service attacks from.
Spywares are meant to collect user information, so that the malware author
can profit from these information. This type of information leakage could
contribute to credit card fraud or identity theft.
These general behaviors give us a starting point for our behavior-based
approach to detect some specific types of malwares.
2.4.2 Limited Malware Actions
We believe that malwares are inherently simple programs, with a limited
set of behaviors. If we look at malwares from a software designer point
of view, we see that malwares can decomposed into the following packages





Error in network service configuration,
Infection Install rootkits,
Replicate to local files,
Enable malware during startup,
Hide from system,
Sabotage anti-virus defenses,
Propagation Search hosts in local subnet,
Send exploit to other external hosts,
Search files,
Email malware to addresses found,
Copy malware to open network shares,





Table 2.1: Malware Packages and Examples of Functions
The bulk of anti-virus research concentrates on preventing the malwares
from entering the system; or if the malware succeeds in entering the sys-
tem, prevents the executable from being executed or loaded. The prob-
lem with stopping attack vectors is that there are just too many different
kinds. Even if we just look at buffer overflows, there are almost countless
possibilities as any network-based applications or services; from the Inter-
net Explorer to the LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service)
could harbor potential vulnerabilities.
In addition, we notice from the initial study of prevalent viruses and worms
in Chapter 4 that a large number of attack vectors depend on the careless-
ness of the user. A number of malwares depend on the users clicking on
unknown attachments from emails, internet relay chats (IRC) or instant
messengers. In fact, users are so careless that a number of newer malwares
expects them to run unknown files from peer-2-peer or network file shares.
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Weak password and executable rights on network shares is also another vec-
tor. These are all attack vectors that most research cannot guard against.
Our behavioral approach concentrates on dynamically looking for behav-
iors that indicate malwares had successfully entered our systems. That
means we are effectively bypassing the detection of the entry mechanism,
which have a large and constantly growing number of attack vectors and
innovative exploits. We take advantage of the fact that while malwares
can have many attack vectors, they have a limited number of actions that
enables them to successfully replicate and perform their nefarious deeds.
2.4.3 Advantage against Obfuscated Threats
Recent malwares have attempted to use obfuscation techniques like poly-
morphism or metamorphism to hide from signature-based systems. For
polymorphic malware, the exploit payload is either encrypted or encoded.
For metamorphic malwares, parts of the instruction codes of the exploit are
replaced with equivalent but different instruction codes. These obfuscated
payloads will not match any previous pattern-based signatures because
they will be different every time.
These threats cannot hide from our behavior-based system because exploits
must be decrypted or decoded before activation. While binaries of meta-
morphic exploits can be changed to render previous signatures useless, the
actions taken by the exploits are still the same. Unless the malware refrains
from any known destructive or suspicious behaviors, we would still be able
to detect them.
Thus, evading a behavioral signature requires a change in the fundamental
behaviors, not just its binary code. Modifying malwares to escape behav-
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ioral detection may be more difficult than just simple code transformation.
2.5 Limitations of Approach
2.5.1 Weakness of Dynamic System
Our behavioral approach, based on dynamic analysis of process behaviors
within a system, aims to complement current signature-based techniques.
It cannot replace static analysis because not all malware functions can be
detected dynamically as certain conditions need to be met for some func-
tions to occur.
For example, a number of malwares we studied attempts to terminate cer-
tain anti-virus systems or firewalls. If such software were not installed, we
would not be able to study how the malwares kill these processes.
2.5.2 Truly Novel Behaviors
As our approach to detect newer malwares depends on the assumption that
most malwares share some behavioral characteristics, it is unlikely that our
behavior-based system will be able to detect malwares with truly novel be-
haviors.
If a new malware has behavioral characteristics so new or novel that no one
has seen before, our system will not realize that it is under attack without
any description of the new attack vector or characteristics.
It is also possible that some new malware could have functions that when
seen individually are benign, but harmful when executed in some particular
order. It is extremely difficult to detect this type of malware if we never
encountered one before.
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2.5.3 False Positive Rates
While the signature-based systems can detect malwares with very high level
of confidence, our approach might generate a higher rate of false positives
as our detection strategy depends on generalized behaviors that might be
shared by normal applications.
Whether our approach can be refined to a satisfactory trade-off between
false positive and detection rates is a question that we hope to answer in
our future research.
2.6 Motivation
The study of malware behaviors has always been the domain of the anti-
virus companies and a handful of malware researchers in various informa-
tion security firms. Commercial tools like the Norman Sandbox [10] that
can extract high-level behaviors from executable files arose from such re-
searches. The problem is that these companies do not reveal any important
details or quantitative data to the academic world. Even the information
released cannot be readily verified because of the lack of implementation
details or because propriety tools were used.
We want to study the behavioral approach to address the malware problems
because it provides another angle of looking at these threats. We believe
that understanding threats based on their behaviors provides a holistic
view, and it is a promising model to start with. Furthermore, we believe
that it can complement current technology.
We would like to provide a flexible framework that can be used to study
malware behaviors. We hope to use this framework in future research to
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provide quantitative data about the behaviors of malwares. This research
raises a lot of questions and considerations that are very helpful to malware
researchers because there are no current quantitative studies on malware
behaviors. We also hope that further research will lead to a better malware
classification scheme than the current ad hoc scheme that we will discuss
in Section 4.10.1.
At this point, some of the interesting questions we would like to answer
with our research are:
• Can behaviors by reliably extract from the operating system?
• Can behaviors be used to detect known malwares?
• Can behaviors be used to detect unknown malwares?
• Are malware behaviors similar to normal application behaviors?
In further research, we would also like to find out if malware behaviors are
more similar among malwares within the same family, as opposed to across
different families based on the current classification scheme.
2.7 Potential
While this research is only in the initial stage, we believe that further re-
search can provide quantitative data that is useful to many information
security researchers and practitioners. For example, the data can be used
to help commercial behavior blockers to be more specific when guarding
against malware actions. This research also has the potential to allow mal-
ware family classification using another paradigm. Finally, the information
learned from future research in this area will help virus researchers and
reverse engineers understand newer malwares better.
Chapter 3
Related Works
In a nutshell, my research aims to study the high level behaviors of mal-
wares, for the purpose of detection and classification, using the Windows
native API system calls. We will discuss the various degrees of overlaps
between my work and other research works in this chapter.
3.1 Anomaly-based IDS using System Calls
There are a very large number of intrusion detection researches that looks
at using system calls as a proxy for host’s behavior, mostly in the Linux and
UNIX environment. The number of such research working in the Windows
environment is very small (see Section 5.1.3 for details). In many of these
researches, the emphasis is on using techniques from various fields like data
mining or text categorization to model normal or abnormal behavior based
on sequences of system calls.
Using such techniques require a fixed format dataset of “transactions”.
The API system calls themselves do not have homogeneous format, with
different number of parameters, parameters data types and return status
codes. And since operating system behaviors like files, memory, network,
etc all work differently, it is very hard to use all the system call information.
18
19
Many researches only use certain system call information, like the system
call name alone, or with return value; but this means a lot of information
is lost.
As our approach uses pattern matching to model behaviors, we have the
option to use as many parameters as we need because we do not have the
restriction of fixed data format.
The most common method to get the sequences of system call is by using
sliding windows to extract a certain number of system call events from the
entire system, or from just one process. Such solution is not very accurate
because it loses context as a system call may rely on information provided
by a previous system call event not within the current window. It also
suffers from too much noise as system calls from unrelated behaviors like
GUI or Windows synchronization will be mixed in.
This is not a big problem for anomaly-based systems as all the errors should
be reduced with a large enough training data set, but it will be disastrous
for our approach of detecting specific behaviors. We will introduce a new
method to extract sequences of related system calls later.
The fixed or variable sliding windows of system call events are then as-
signed values representing normalcy or abnormality using various tech-
niques. These values are then used to compute numerical results, whereby
a value over a predefined threshold represents the probability of a normal
behavior or an intrusion.
There are many such related IDS works that should be cited, but as we
have limited space in our thesis, we will only cite some of the more relevant
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works [14, 20, 35, 43, 44] for brevity.
3.2 Behavior Specific Research
In this section, we will introduce some research that concentrates on one
or two behaviors.
3.2.1 Windows Registry Accesses
Stolfo, et al. [46, 1, 17] proposed to monitor Windows registry accesses.
They used an anomaly-based approach: by considering the conditional
probabilities between registry access datasets, they use this information to
score registry records within processes to see if the process is anomalous.
The dataset uses five features: name of process, type of query, actual key,
return code and value of the key.
3.2.2 File System Accesses
Hershkop, et al. [19, 18] proposed to monitor file system accesses. They
use seven features for each file access dataset: UID, user working directory,
command line, parent directory of file, file name, PRE-FILE (concatenation
of last 3 files) and frequency of file access (discretized: never, few, some,
often). They use an anomaly-based detection algorithm similar to the
previous work.
3.2.3 Code Injection Attacks
Chung and Mok [11] proposed to target code injection attacks as an im-
provement to system-call-based anomaly detection systems: trapping in-
trusion by catching code executing in data space. The claim is that it
works like a specification-based intrusion detection system with only one
21
specified rule. It is also like a behavior-based system detecting only one
behavior.
3.2.4 Code Replication
Summerville, et al. [47, 41, 40] proposed to detect the self-replication of
codes, both local and network. Their implementation uses native Windows
API, and the way they model behaviors from the system calls seems to be
very similar to ours. But as the details of their implementation are vague,
we cannot tell exactly how similar our implementations are.
3.2.5 Email Propagation Behaviors
Hu and Mok [22] proposed to monitor file searches and emails sent, to detect
mass mailer viruses. This approach works because they use honeytoken
files and email addresses, which are faked and not supposed to be accessed.
Any access will be suspicious. Honeytokens are also used in our work.
The behaviors are captured using API calls, and anomaly-based detection
techniques are used to determine legal or illegal behaviors.
3.2.6 Network Traffic Monitoring
Williamson, et al. from Hewlett-Packard Labs proposed [57, 58, 50] a virus
throttling strategy to slow down propagation of certain classes of worms
and viruses based on normal network behavior. It is observed that a com-
puter normally make fairly little attempts to connect to new machines,
which is the opposite behavior of a rapidly spreading worm.
If a computer starts to make many connections to new machines, the sus-
picious traffic will be rate-limited, and can be stopped. They only look out




In this section, other behavior-based research will be explored.
3.3.1 Deductive Reasoning
Hollebeek and Waltzman [21] from Teknowledge Corp proposed using com-
puter forensics techniques to manually create general rules describing sus-
picious events, and using directed acyclic graph for deductive reasoning of
intrusion. The sensor used is the SafeFamily wrapper [3, 2], which inter-
cepts shared library calls.
The basic idea behind both our approaches is very similar, but we create
behavioral signatures from previously seen malware behaviors instead.
3.3.2 Static Analysis for Vicious Executable
Xu, et al. from New Mexico Tech [59] proposed an anti-virus system SAVE
(Static Analyzer for Vicious Executable) that analyzes the API calling
sequence of the binary, instead of the binary code itself. The signatures
used are API calling sequence of known malware. Detection is based on
the similarity between their database of signatures and the target’s calling
sequence.
3.3.3 Malware Behavior Detection Systems
Norman Anti-virus has a product Norman SandBox [10] that can study
the actions taken by an executable file. The Sandbox captures behaviors
like file, registry, memory and network accesses. Because it is a commercial
product, we have no knowledge of its implementation.
Willems attempts to replicate and improve upon the Norman SandBox,
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and implemented the CWSandbox [54, 55, 56]. But rather than to mon-
itor the operating system, CWSandbox works by injecting API hooking
code into the malware application. Thus any API call by the malware is
directed to CWSandbox, instead of to Windows. The behaviors provided
by CWSandbox are only as descriptive as the system call allows.
Bayer’s TTAnalyze [6] is another such system. The implementation is by
means of emulating the Windows environment. Like CWSandbox, system
calls can only provide low-level behavioral information.
3.3.4 Gatekeeper
Wagner’s [52] work uses Florida Institute of Technology’s Gatekeeper sys-
tem to identify malwares.
The initial portion of both our research have very much in common, both
our research surveys malware descriptions from anti-virus companies to find
out what kind of behaviors to look for. Gatekeeper monitors the Win32
API system call, which is at a higher level than our native level API. While
Win32 API system calls are more descriptive than the native level, mal-
wares may utilize other high level APIs thus bypassing Gatekeeper.
As the aim of Gatekeeper is to detect malwares to undo their damages,
whereas our aim is to detect and classify, the focus of our analysis are very
different.
3.3.5 Behavioral Classification
Lee and Mody’s work [26] attempt to classify malwares based on the be-
haviors. Like our work, they use sequences of native API system calls.
But from the examples given, it appears that they capture native APIs
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system calls at the kernel mode. This is significant because our work, like
many other security products, can only captures the system call at the user
mode. Our hypothesis is that because the authors belong to Microsoft’s
anti-malware team, they have special access to the Windows kernel.
They extract sequences of system calls to form Event Objects. As the
article is vague on details, we do not know the algorithm for this extrac-
tion. Similarities between objects are then calculated based on string edit
distance. The results are then clustered using what the authors call a
k-medoid partitioning algorithm, which is a modified K-means algorithm
using medoids rather than centroids. Classification of malwares is based
on their edit distance from the nearest medoid.
Chapter 4
Malware Behaviors
In this chapter, we will make use of publicly available information from the
anti-virus companies. We will first identify some of the malware behav-
iors worth looking into, and do a preliminary study on the level of shared
behaviors within the same family and across different families.
4.1 Malware Propagation Share and Trends
In any behavioral studies, it is important to have a large sample popula-
tion. But as the number of available malwares is too large for this study,
we decided to limit the actual test samples based on their prevalence and
importance.
Proof-of-concept malwares are written specifically to test some new vulner-
abilities or attack vectors, and do not cause much harm. While this class of
malwares is interesting, they do not provide much behavioral information.
Therefore we do not bother about this class of malwares.
On the other hand, in-the-wild malwares are actually spreading through-
out the Internet. A number of anti-virus companies provide lists of the top
most prevalent malwares captured, and Kaspersky Lab has a comprehen-
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sive archive of their past “Top Twenty viruses” of the month. Kaspersky’s
Top Twenty [24] virus list begins from 2001, and we compiled 48 months
worth of viruses that appeared on the lists, from November 2001 to Jan-
























Table 4.1: Captured Traffic

















Table 4.2: Captured Traf-
fic Share of Top 13 Malware
Families
A total of 274 unique malwares from 168 families were identified. We can
see from Table 4.1 that the top twenty malwares represents 71.0639% of
the total captured malware traffic population. The 20 most prevalent mal-
wares belong in 13 families and the top 13 families represents 80.4135%
of the total population as seen from Table 4.2. Details about the variants
within the malware families can be seem from Appendix A.
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The malware share information from both Table 4.1 and 4.2 was simply
computed from the percentage of the malware traffic shares over 48 months.
We know that older results should be less important, and a factor should
be included to give shares from recent months more importance. But we
believe that this simple result is sufficient for the initial study, and a reward
factor biased towards more recent malwares will be included in our future
work.
This information provides confidence that a small set of prevalent malwares
is a good enough starting point for our research.
4.2 Malware Sample Choices
Anti-virus companies spend enormous effort to study malwares using static
and dynamic analysis. As a service to their customers and for public re-
lations purposes, technical characteristics of malwares detected by their
products are openly available, albeit lacking in details.
As a starting point in our research and to boost confidence that malwares
do exhibit similar behaviors, we decided to first study the descriptions of
a small sample of malwares.
From the initial study of the malware descriptions from anti-virus compa-
nies, one observation made was that a significant number of malwares from
the same family have almost identical technical descriptions, differing only
in the keywords or file names used. Even if the newer malware have more





























Table 4.4: Newer Malware
Variants From Some Sample
Families
We decided to concentrate on the earliest discovered virus of each family.
The bulk of the initial behavioral study from the descriptions was from
the first malware from each of the more prevalent families, as shown in
Table 4.3. We included several newer malware variants from some of the
sample families in the study, shown in Table 4.4, to compare the difference
between ancestor and descendant behavioral functions.
The reader might notice that the sample malwares were not all drawn from
the most prevalent families shown in Table 4.2. The reason is because
as this research is based on the dynamic behavior of the malware, we are
constraint to include only malwares that we can find the executables for.
Therefore, the total number of malwares we will be using in this initial
study is twenty-four.
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4.3 Malware Behavior Survey
4.3.1 Choice of Information Source
The samples of malwares that we chose are identified by Kaspersky Lab’s
naming conventions because we used Kaspersky Lab’s Top Twenty Virus
ranking information. The problem of using just Kaspersky Lab’s malware
descriptions is that it does not provide very detailed technical descriptions
for all the malwares, and there are some ambiguities because English is a
not a precise language. After exploring the databases of different anti-virus
companies, I’ve decided to add information from Computer Associates and
Trend Micro because the union of the information from these different anti-
virus companies’ description database provides a good level of accuracy.
An extract of the technical description of Email-Worm.Win32.Bagle.ai from
Kaspersky Lab is as follows. The full technical description is available in
Appendix E.
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Figure 4.1: Extract of Kaspersky Lab Email-Worm.Win32.Bagle.at De-
scription
4.3.2 Text Description Conversion to Behavioral Func-
tions
To improve the confidence of our assumption that malwares share similar
behaviors, we have to quantify the similarities of malware behaviors. The
problem is that descriptions written in normal English cannot be used to
generate quantifying statistics. We would need to create a grammar to
describe behaviors based on logic.
In an ideal situation, we should decide on what behaviors to detect, and
then decide on the sensors needed to collect the necessary information.
But in reality, we are doing both at same time to find out our limitations
and constraints. As we chose to monitor the native API system calls, we
understand that there are certain behaviors that cannot be detected: for
example, program logic like “if else” decisions; or manipulation of data
based on regular expressions (used for ignoring certain type of email ad-
dresses).
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As there are many unknown variables and the descriptions are highly com-
plex, the conversion matrix is incomplete at this time and are constantly
redesigned to fit new scenarios. The basic criteria we imposed on the con-
version process are that the descriptive functions must be:
• Expressive enough to replace the language descriptions.
• Simple enough to be parsed by scripting languages using regular ex-
pressions.
• Possible to be detected using native API system calls.
We decided to represent the behavior functions using a pseudo language
based on the Perl language and UNIX shell commands. Two converted
examples are shown in Appendix F.
4.4 Behavior Functions
We will introduce the functions seen in the malware descriptions and their
parameters in this section. As we are introducing sixty-nine behaviors, we
will only demonstrate a couple of examples of the conversion process.
Figure 4.2: Description of Email-Worm.Win32.Bagle.at File Copy and Reg-
istry Creation Behaviors
From Figure 4.2, we know that the malware copy itself to three files:
file copy $SELF C:\Windows\System32\wingo.exe ;
file copy $SELF C:\Windows\System32\wingo.exeopen ;
file copy $SELF C:\Windows\System32\wingo.exeopenopen ;
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where $SELF is the original malware binary file that was started.
Then we have an addition to the registry:
registry add
"HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”
"wingo = %System%\wingo.exe" ;
where %System% is the variable name for C:\Windows\System32 under
certain versions of Windows. We will elaborate on this later. Thus, we
captured two behavioral functions.
4.4.1 File and Directory
In most of the write-based file functions below, the parameter that is
most important for providing information to differentiate malwares is the
path. The paths that we are most concern about are the Windows direc-
tory (%Windows%) and the Windows System directory (%System%). The
%System% folder is usually C:\Windows\System on Windows 95, 98 and
ME, C:\WINNT\System32 on Windows NT and 2000, and C:\Windows\
System32 on Windows XP. The %Windows% folder is usually C:\Windows
or C:\WINNT. These paths are noteworthy because most legitimate pro-
grams do not create or write to files within these folders.
FUNCTION: file copy
SYNOPSIS: file copy $SOURCE $TARGET
DESCRIPTION: -
SPECIAL: Many older malwares copy themselves into the Windows
or System directories. It is a calculated move because Mi-
crosoft discourages most users from changing or viewing
anything in the Windows root directory.
33
FUNCTION: file create
SYNOPSIS: file create $PATH\$FILE
DESCRIPTION: create a new file.
SPECIAL: Many newer malwares do not just copy themselves into
the host. The new versions of themselves are modified
slightly to thwart anti-virus systems.
AMBIGUITY: Due to ambiguities in the descriptions, file create could
also include the file copy function.
FUNCTION: file append
SYNOPSIS: file append $PATH\$FILE
DESCRIPTION: write data to file in streams.
FUNCTION: file attrib
SYNOPSIS: file attrib [+-]$ATTRIBUTES $PATH\$FILE
DESCRIPTION: change the attribute or permission of the file. The
attributes arguments are hidden, system, read-only or
archive; and they can be set (+) or unset (-)
FUNCTION: file modify
SYNOPSIS: file modify $PATH\$FILE
DESCRIPTION: write data to file.
FUNCTION: file property
SYNOPSIS: file property $PROPERTY $PATH\$FILE
DESCRIPTION: change the property of the file.
There are many possible arguments for property.
Time information alone includes CreationTime, LastAc-
cessTime, LastWriteTime and ChangeTime.
FUNCTION: file rename




SYNOPSIS: file delete $PATH\$FILE
DESCRIPTION: -
FUNCTION: file execute
SYNOPSIS: file execute $PATH\$FILE [$PARAMETERS]
DESCRIPTION: execute file, with optional command line parameters
FUNCTION: file read
SYNOPSIS: file read $PATH\$FILE
DESCRIPTION: read data directly from file.
FUNCTION: file load
SYNOPSIS: file load $PATH\$FILE
DESCRIPTION: load file data into memory.
SPECIAL: There are a number of ways to accomplish this function;
the most common using shared Library APIs. The man-
ual way to do this is by executing the “rundll32.exe”
system file: C:> rundll32.exe $DLL_FILE
FUNCTION: file access
SYNOPSIS: file access $PATH\$FILE
DESCRIPTION: a non-write operation to the file.
AMBIGUITY: Used when the description is unclear, could represent the
file read, file load or file execute function.
FUNCTION: ini modify
SYNOPSIS: ini modify $INI FILE
DESCRIPTION: modify system initialization files like win.ini or sys-
tem.ini.
FUNCTION: create autorun
SYNOPSIS: create autorun $PATH\Autorun.inf
DESCRIPTION: create new Autorun.inf files that define the application
to run when disk is inserted or mounted.
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FUNCTION: dir create
SYNOPSIS: dir create $PATH
DESCRIPTION: create new directory.
FUNCTION: find dir
SYNOPSIS: find dir $EXPRESSION
DESCRIPTION: search for directories with names matching the expression
within the current directory.
FUNCTION: find data files
SYNOPSIS: find data files
DESCRIPTION: search for certain types of data files within the current
directory. Examples of these files include files with the
following extensions: adb, asp, dbx, htm, php, pl, sht,
tbb, wab.
FUNCTION: find bin files
SYNOPSIS: find bin files
DESCRIPTION: search for certain types of executable files within the cur-
rent directory. Examples of these files include files with
the following extensions: com, exe, pif, scr.
FUNCTION: search all dir recursive
SYNOPSIS: search all dir recursive
DESCRIPTION: enter all the directories and sub-directories, recursively,
starting from the root directory of a system (usually
“C:”).
FUNCTION: search specific dir recursive
SYNOPSIS: search specific dir recursive $PATH
DESCRIPTION: enter all the directories and sub-directories, recursively,
starting from the path in the argument.
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4.4.2 Service
A Windows service is a background application that starts when Windows
is booted, conceptually similar to a Unix daemon. Microsoft uses the term
“service” loosely because a number of other different concepts are named
service as well. Windows provides a Service Control Manager (SCM) in-
terface that manages creating, deleting, starting and stopping of services.
FUNCTION: service create
SYNOPSIS: service create $SERVICENAME $FILE
DESCRIPTION: create a new service, either though the SCM, or by adding
new key to the registry.
service create
FUNCTION: service disable
SYNOPSIS: service disable $SERVICENAME
DESCRIPTION: remove a service, either though the SCM, or by modifying
registry key.
FUNCTION: service start
SYNOPSIS: service create $SERVICENAME
DESCRIPTION: start a service, either though the SCM, or by executing
the “net.exe” system file:
C:> net.exe start $SERVICENAME
FUNCTION: service stop
SYNOPSIS: service stop $SERVICENAME
DESCRIPTION: stop a service, either though the SCM, or by executing
the “net.exe” system file:





DESCRIPTION: enumerate all running processes.
FUNCTION: process status
SYNOPSIS: process status $PROCESS
DESCRIPTION: Report process status.
FUNCTION: kill process
SYNOPSIS: kill process $EXPRESSION
DESCRIPTION: terminate any running process started by any file or pro-
cess, with any identifier matching the given expression.
FUNCTION: mutex create
SYNOPSIS: mutex create $MUTEXNAME
DESCRIPTION: create a new mutex (mutual exclusion) object for syn-
chronization purposes.
FUNCTION: mutex check
SYNOPSIS: mutex check $MUTEXNAME
DESCRIPTION: check for the existence of a mutex object.
FUNCTION: event create
SYNOPSIS: event create $EVENTNAME
DESCRIPTION: create a named event object for synchronization pur-
poses.
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4.4.4 Graphical User Interface
The GUI (Graphical User Interface) objects that we are interested in are
the dialog boxes, which are special windows used to display information to
the user, or to get a response if needed.
FUNCTION: hidden msgbox
SYNOPSIS: hidden msgbox
DESCRIPTION: create a Windows dialog box in the background, unseen
by the user.
SPECIAL: This is a technique to prevent the user from killing its
original application process.
FUNCTION: window box monitor
SYNOPSIS: window box monitor $EXPRESSION
DESCRIPTION: enumerate and monitor all the dialog boxes for any in-
formation matching the expression.
Figure 4.3: Fake Dialog Box displayed by Sober.a
FUNCTION: msgbox
SYNOPSIS: msgbox $BUTTONTYPE $TITLE $MESSAGE
DESCRIPTION: create a Windows dialog box. As an example, Figure 4.3
is represented by
msgbox OKOnly, "Error", "File not complete!" ;
The common button types of the dialog box are





SYNOPSIS: harvest emails $FILE
DESCRIPTION: search for email addresses within file.
FUNCTION: sendmail with attachment
SYNOPSIS: sendmail with attachment $EMAIL
DESCRIPTION: send email with an attachment.
FUNCTION: sendmail
SYNOPSIS: sendmail $EMAIL
DESCRIPTION: send email without any attachments.
FUNCTION: reply inbox/Outlook MAPI
SYNOPSIS: reply inbox
DESCRIPTION: reply to emails inside the INBOX of the user’s Outlook
program. This is usually accomplished using Outlook’s
Messaging Application Programming Interface (MAPI)
API.
4.4.6 System Information
FUNCTION: check system date
SYNOPSIS: check system date
DESCRIPTION: -
FUNCTION: check system information
SYNOPSIS: check system information
DESCRIPTION: check system information such as the regional locale set-





SYNOPSIS: network connect $HOST $PROTOCOL $PORT
DESCRIPTION: any outbound TCP or UDP traffic to remote host.
AMBIGUITY: Due to ambiguities in the descriptions, network connect




DESCRIPTION: high rate of traffic to existing or non-existent hosts within
a subnet.
FUNCTION: dns resolve
SYNOPSIS: dns resolve $DNSSERVER $DOMAIN
DESCRIPTION: perform network domain name resolution on a domain
name to get its IP address. The DNS server used is usu-
ally predefined in the Windows network configuration.
FUNCTION: http connect
SYNOPSIS: http connect $URL




DESCRIPTION: outbound NTP traffic, usually to port 123 of remote host.
Used to determine the current time and date by synchro-
nizing with the NTP server.
FUNCTION: irc connect
SYNOPSIS: irc connect $HOST
DESCRIPTION: outbound IRC traffic to remote host.
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FUNCTION: netbios connect
SYNOPSIS: netbios connect $HOST




DESCRIPTION: outbound ICMP ECHO request to remote host.
FUNCTION: download inet
SYNOPSIS: download inet $URL
DESCRIPTION: download file using HTTP or FTP protocol.
FUNCTION: listen port
SYNOPSIS: listen port $PROTOCOL $PORT
DESCRIPTION: open a network port listening for either TCP or UDP
protocol traffic.
4.4.8 Windows Network File Sharing
FUNCTION: share enum
SYNOPSIS: share enum
DESCRIPTION: enumerate or find all Windows network shares within the
host’s subnet.
FUNCTION: remote share mount
SYNOPSIS: remote share mount $SHARENAME
DESCRIPTION: mount Windows network share with either no password,
or using predefined usernames and weak passwords.
FUNCTION: remote share activity
SYNOPSIS: remote share activity




The Windows registry is a database that stores the operating system set-
tings and options for Microsoft Windows 95 and later. It contains infor-
mation and settings for all the hardware, software, users, preferences of
the PC and so on. The Registry was introduced to replace most of the
text-based .ini files used in Windows 3.x and MS-DOS configuration files,
such as the Autoexec.bat and Config.sys.
In most of the write-based registry functions below, the parameter that is
most important for providing information to differentiate malwares is the
key. Examples of the keys that we are most concern about are those that

















this key holds the full path to a DLL file if the “COM” object
is implemented as a library. In a nutshell, the DLL file will be
launched as a procedure linked to “Explorer.exe” if the 16-byte
ID is “E6FB5E20-DE35-11CF-9C87-00AA005127ED”.
These keys are noteworthy because most legitimate programs do not create
or write to them during normal operations.
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FUNCTION: registry modify
SYNOPSIS: registry modify $KEY $VALUE
DESCRIPTION: modify the value of an existing registry key.
FUNCTION: registry add
SYNOPSIS: registry add $KEY $SUBKEY $VALUE
DESCRIPTION: add new registry subkey with value data to an existing
registry key.
FUNCTION: registry delete
SYNOPSIS: registry delete $KEY $SUBKEY
DESCRIPTION: delete registry subkey.
FUNCTION: registry enum
SYNOPSIS: registry enum $KEY
DESCRIPTION: enumerate all the subkeys of the registry key.
FUNCTION: registry query
SYNOPSIS: registry query $KEY
DESCRIPTION: query the value contained within the registry key.
In the registry query function, the parameter that is most important for
providing information to differentiate malwares is the value data within the
key. Examples of these keys are:
$NAMESERVER: IP address of the default DNS Server or Resolver
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\
Parameters\Interfaces\{16-byte ID}\NameServer
$SMTPSERVER: IP address of the default SMTP Mail Server
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Account Manager\
Accounts\00000001\SMTP Server
$WAB: Location of user’s INBOX file
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WAB\WAB4\Wab File Name




4.4.10 Suspicious Activity or Condition
FUNCTION: zombie
SYNOPSIS: zombie
DESCRIPTION: any actions requiring remote activation.
FUNCTION: code injection
SYNOPSIS: code injection $PROCESS $FILE
DESCRIPTION: injection of instruction code from file into process not
started by the malware.
FUNCTION: keylogger
SYNOPSIS: keylogger
DESCRIPTION: captures the user’s keystrokes either by hooking to the
API I/O library, or kernel’s keyboard driver.
FUNCTION: date activated
SYNOPSIS: date activated $DATE
DESCRIPTION: start or terminate malware actions based on time or date.
FUNCTION: date activated payload
SYNOPSIS: date activated payload $DATE
DESCRIPTION: start external payload actions based on time or date.
FUNCTION: suspicious file
SYNOPSIS: suspicious file $FILE
DESCRIPTION: any actions involving files with suspicious file names.
Examples of these names are:
• names with double extensions like “See Britney naked.jpg.scr”
• names with white spaces between extensions like“Anna Kournikova nude.jpgunionsqunionsq
unionsq unionsq unionsq unionsq unionsq unionsq unionsq unionsq unionsqunionsq.exe”
FUNCTION: suspicious email attachment
SYNOPSIS: suspicious email attachment $ATTACHMENT




These are all the other ways that a malware can start within the host with-
out relying on explicit user intervention.
FUNCTION: start from internet explorer
SYNOPSIS: start from internet explorer
DESCRIPTION: malware started because of Internet Explorer vulnerabil-
ity.
FUNCTION: start from outlook
SYNOPSIS: start from outlook
DESCRIPTION: malware started because of Outlook or Outlook Express
vulnerability.
FUNCTION: start from windows exploits
SYNOPSIS: start from windows exploits
DESCRIPTION: malware started because of Windows network service vul-
nerability.
FUNCTION: start from network share
SYNOPSIS: start from network share
DESCRIPTION: malware started remotely through network share.
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4.5 Risk Differentiation
In our study of the behavior functions based on the technical description,
we learned that just looking at the behavior alone will result in the lost of
important information.
We need to include differences in the risk factor based on some of the pa-
rameters. For example, there are different levels of risk for file copy,
just based on the target directory of the copied file. The risk for a file
to be copied into systems directories like the Windows root “C:\WINNT”
or system “C:\WINNT\System32” directory is much higher than any other
directories.
Another example is for file execute. As malwares that are not activate
carries little risk, the risk for activating a newly created file is higher than
an existing system file. In addition, malwares sometimes start applications
like the Windows notepad or internet explorer as a form of misdirection,
so these behaviors can be used to identify the malwares.
In our current analysis, while we do differentiate certain behaviors based
on risk, we do not impose any risk weightage as we do not have enough
information to derive the risk modifier for the behaviors and we do not
want to do it in an ad hoc way. For example, while irc connect and ping
are subset of network connect, we treat them as different behaviors. This
will affect any analysis of the similar between malwares.
In further work, we would like to study the appropriate modifier or weigh-
tage between behaviors, so that two malwares that have the irc connect
and ping behaviors respectively have a certain similarity factor, instead of
none currently.
47
4.6 Compilation of All Behavior Functions
We compiled a matrix of malwares versus behavior functions based on all
the behaviors discussed in the sample malware descriptions in Section 4.4.
We will analyze the information from this matrix to support the feasibility
of the behavior-based systems and our assumptions. The matrix can be
found in Appendix B.
The entries in the matrix are not only categorized by behavior functions,
the parameters that introduce different level of risks as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.5 are also used. Each of the behavior function entries has three
possible states: FALSE (0), TRUE (1), MAYBE (2). From the anti-virus
descriptions, we notice that some behaviors are certain, while some are
optional based on certain conditions. For example, while the behavior of
activation of destructive payload by the hacker is very interesting, we are
unable to reproduce this. As we aim to take care of all behaviors, we
added a MAYBE state to optional behaviors. But compulsory behaviors
take precedence in all our analysis.
4.7 Prevalent Behaviors
We believe that malwares from across different families share common be-
havioral functions. To show this, we compiled the frequency of behavior
appearance based on the first malware variant from each of the 15 sample
families.
From Figure 4.4, we can see that the most common behaviors are registry
add, file copy, find data files, file create and harvest emails. These
functions are related to two complex behaviors: surviving system reboot
and finding email addresses. This is not much of a surprise as most of the
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Figure 4.4: Most Prevalent Malware Behaviors
sample malwares are mass mailer viruses. We will use this information in
our analysis later.
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4.8 Combinations of Independent Behaviors
We can see from Figure 4.4 that no one behavior can identify all the mal-
wares. Thus we will first look at the different combinations of independent












































Number of Function Pairs (2-tuple)
Figure 4.5: Coverage of Malware Behavior Pairs
When we use two behaviors, we can detect all the sample malwares. From
Figure 4.5, 12 out of 1770 behavior pairs covers 100% of the detection of
malwares. If we use three behaviors, we can see from Figure 4.6 that 849
out of 34,220 behavior triplets offer 100% coverage.
For the behavior pairs that offer 100% coverage, the prevalent behavior is
the registry add function. From Table 4.5, we see that registry add ac-
counts for 83.33%, or 10 out of 12 of the behavior pairs. For combinations
of three behaviors, registry add accounts for 63.02% or 535 out of 849 of













































Number of Function Triplets (3-tuple)
Figure 4.6: Coverage of Malware Behavior Triplets
registry add, file copy
registry add, find data files
registry add, file create
registry add, file append
registry add, registry query
registry add, file access
registry add, search specific directories recursively
registry add, file attrib
registry add, msgbox
registry add, registry modify
file copy, file execute
find data files, listen port
Table 4.5: Behavior Pairs That Cover 100% of Malwares
The first conclusion that we can draw from this analysis is that we do not
need to monitor for all of the behaviors to detect malwares. Even a small
subset of behavioral functions can do a good job.
The second conclusion is that in both single and combinations of behav-
iors, some behaviors are more important. We can see from Table 4.5 that
registry add is the most important function in behavior pairs. Even when
we use three behaviors, this function still carries the most weight.
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The third conclusion is that we have choices in the choosing of behav-
iors to monitor if we just want to detect malwares. For example, while
registry add is the dominating function in the behavior triplets as it ac-
counts for 63.02% of the behavior triplets that offers 100% malware cover-
age, we can also use file copy. The function accounts for 24.15%, or 205
out of 849 of the behavior triplets.
This is important for two reasons: the first is that some behaviors might
be very difficult to obtain. The second reason is that it is entirely possible
for a malware author to forgo a dominating behavior in order to thwart
our behavior-based system. This conclusion tells us that we can use other
combinations of behaviors as a competent replacement for any dominating
behaviors.
4.9 Complex or Correlated Behaviors
Complex behaviors are formed by correlation of simple behaviors based on
certain information. We will provide a few examples in this section.
4.9.1 Survive System Reboot
The most common behavior among all the malwares is the ability to start
itself after a system reboot. The most common way to do this is by the
combination of two functions: copy itself to the host or create a new file,
and add a registry key to run the said file at startup. We can see a sam-
ple of this in the example provided in Section 4.4. In Figure 4.7, we see
that twenty-two out of twenty-four malwares exhibit this complex behavior.



















Figure 4.7: Correlated survive system reboot Behavior
can also add a new service that runs the file at boot time (registry add
service), or modify the registry to run the file whenever files of certain ex-
tensions are started (registry modify shell).
If any of the three correlated behaviors in Figure 4.7 is true, we take it that
the survive system reboot behavior is true as well. We can see from the
figure that 100% of the sample malwares exhibits this behavior.
Details about the distribution between malwares and behaviors that formed
Figure 4.7 can be seem in Appendix C.1.
4.9.2 Find Email Addresses
The next most common behavior is for the malware to find email addresses
in the local host for propagation purposes. The way to do this is by the
combination of three functions: search directories recursively, look for data
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Figure 4.8: Correlated find email addresses Behavior
From the descriptions, we know that the malware either search certain di-
rectories or all directories starting from the root “C:\”. If any of the two
correlated behaviors in Figure 4.8 is true, we take it that the find email
addresses behavior is true as well. We can see from the figure that only
twenty or 83.33% of the malwares exhibits this behavior.
Details about the distribution between malwares and behaviors that formed
Figure 4.8 can be seem in Appendix C.2.
Of the malwares that do not exhibit this behavior, Lovesan.a and Welchia.a
are network worms and SpyBot.a is a P-2-P worm. Klez.a only harvest
email addresses from the default Windows Address Book and do not search
for other files.
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+ find_bin_files + file_modify)
Percentage
Figure 4.9: Correlated local replication Behavior
One very interesting observation is that the behavior of local replication
does not occur very frequently. From Figure 4.9, only 20.83% of the mal-
wares exhibits this behavior. This behavior is achieved by the combination
of three functions: search directories recursively, look for binary files with
extensions like exe or com within those directories, and modify the located
files.
Details about the distribution between malwares and behaviors that formed
Figure 4.9 can be seem in Appendix C.3.
This is strange because local replication is the hallmark of most viruses.
One possible reason why local replication to executable files is not popular
could be due to the system restore feature in Windows 2000 and above. We
noticed in our analysis of several malwares that Windows performed cryp-
tographic checksum verifications on the system files that were changed. If
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the checksum of the file was incorrect, the changed file would be overwritten
by the original version of the file.
4.10 Study of Cross Family Behaviors
4.10.1 Malware Naming and Classification Conven-
tion
As we want to study the behavioral similarity between malwares within a
family, and across different families, we will provide a short background
on the current naming and classification convention used by the anti-virus
companies.
After decades of virus research, there is still no standard way to name a
malware [53]. While there are attempts to standardize the naming con-
vention like the Common Malware Enumeration (CME) Project [13], most
researchers still continue the decade old tradition of ad hoc naming due to
the commercial pressure to be the first to detect more new malwares.
At best, we have guidelines [36, 23] on how not to name a malware, and
the CARO (Computer Anti-Virus Research Organization) Malware Nam-
ing Scheme [7, 9] to categorize the malware into different types.
The general format of a full CARO malware name is
[〈type〉://][〈platform〉/]〈family〉[.〈group〉][.〈length〉].〈variant〉
[〈modifiers〉][!〈comment〉]
where the items in square brackets are optional. Most anti-virus companies
use a variation of this format, and we will take Kaspersky Lab’s naming of
“Email-Worm.Win32.Bagle.at” as an example:
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modifiers - type . platform . family . variant
Email - Worm . Win32 . Bagle . at
Malware Family
The malware family name is basically the initial name given to a malware
that is significantly different from the anti-virus companies’ specification
of all the other known malwares. We will provide a few example of how
malwares were named to give the reader an idea how ad hoc the process
actually is.
We have the totally random ones like: the Code Red worm [27] named af-
ter a cola, and the Melissa worm [30] named after a lap dancer in Florida.
Then, we have those named from keywords within the malware source code:
the Klez virus [16], and MyDoom [5], whose source code included “mydom”
(short for “my domain”).
The Nyxem [15] virus was named because it was the first virus to launch a
DDoS attack against the “New York Mercantile Exchange” website (www.
nymex.com), and the Sasser virus was named because it targets the Lo-
cal Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) [32] of the Windows
operating system.
Malware Variant
The naming tradition affects how the anti-virus companies classify mal-
wares into the different existing families as variants. There is no fixed clas-
sification scheme, and could be based on attributes like the malwares source
code, keywords found within the malware, exploits used or actions taken
by the malware. As the actual classification process varies between the
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different anti-virus companies according to the malware researcher’s bias,
a malware could be classified into different families by different researchers.
For example, the same worm was named W32/Mydoom@MM, Novarg and
Mimail.r respectively by Network Associates, Symantec Corp and Trend
Micro [29].
In spite of this problem, we believe it is likely that malware variants within a
family are similar because of their shared attributes. It would be interesting
to see if the similarity extends to our behavior-based approach.
4.10.2 Malware Similarity Matrix
Our assumption is that malwares within the same family have more be-
havioral functions in common, as opposed to malwares from other families.
If this is true, then it should be possible to detect previously unseen mal-
wares based on their similar set of functions. To confirm this, we formed











SimilarityIndexa,b is the similarity factor betweenMalwarea andMalwareb.
BehaviorSetall is the set of all behavior functions studied.
BehaviorSeta = {m: m is function inBehaviorSetall that exist inMalwarea}
BehaviorSetb = {n: n is function inBehaviorSetall that exist inMalwareb}
The Similarity Index between malwares is based on existence of behaviors
alone. The more behavioral functions the two malwares have in common,
the higher the score. Currently, only functions that are compulsory were
used. Functions that only activate in conditions that we cannot replicate
are not used. In further work, we would like to add in these optional
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functions with a modifier so that they are less important than compulsory
function. We would also like to add in weightage for the different levels of





































































































































Klez.a 52 33 29 17 25 21 19 24 11 13 20 22 21 30 10 19 18 17 14 18 19 20 6
Klez.e 52 43 43 25 33 32 26 31 14 9 17 30 21 26 10 23 35 21 23 22 14 16 6
Klez.h 33 43 33 24 29 28 22 39 12 15 19 27 24 35 3 26 20 25 27 21 12 14 6
Zafi.a 29 43 33 41 38 37 34 30 19 15 19 24 24 30 7 21 40 25 33 32 12 23 10
Bagle.a 17 25 24 41 48 45 36 19 28 4 18 21 28 20 9 26 28 25 28 26 15 17 12
Bagle.z 25 33 29 38 48 68 56 23 23 7 19 22 24 30 11 21 35 30 27 32 12 23 10
Bagle.ai 21 32 28 37 45 68 74 26 27 3 22 27 26 29 19 17 34 24 26 30 16 22 13
Bagle.at 19 26 22 34 36 56 74 24 25 6 21 26 25 27 18 19 32 22 24 28 19 21 12
Ganda 24 31 39 30 19 23 26 24 19 19 24 21 29 27 6 41 23 16 17 16 17 8 5
Gibe.a 11 14 12 19 28 23 27 25 19 28 25 21 26 16 11 35 23 15 12 20 32 18 6
Lentin.a 13 9 15 15 4 7 3 6 19 28 15 13 9 11 0 21 12 9 5 9 15 4 4
LovGate.a 20 17 19 19 18 19 22 21 24 25 15 36 72 19 9 24 22 19 16 19 20 14 5
LovGate.ad 22 30 27 24 21 22 27 26 21 21 13 36 35 20 14 15 22 16 14 17 14 16 18
LovGate.b 21 21 24 24 28 24 26 25 29 26 9 72 35 24 6 29 30 24 26 21 21 19 5
Lovelorn.a 30 26 35 30 20 30 29 27 27 16 11 19 20 24 4 32 17 32 42 33 17 19 3
Lovesan.a 10 10 3 7 9 11 19 18 6 11 0 9 14 6 4 8 16 9 5 21 10 8 42
Mimail.a 19 23 26 21 26 21 17 19 41 35 21 24 15 29 32 8 18 22 24 29 30 7 3
Mydoom.a 18 35 20 40 28 35 34 32 23 23 12 22 22 30 17 16 18 20 26 17 10 23 15
Sober.a 17 21 25 25 25 30 24 22 16 15 9 19 16 24 32 9 22 20 47 53 16 13 0
Sober.f 14 23 27 33 28 27 26 24 17 12 5 16 14 26 42 5 24 26 47 50 18 14 0
Sober.g 18 22 21 32 26 32 30 28 16 20 9 19 17 21 33 21 29 17 53 50 24 14 4
Sobig.a 19 14 12 12 15 12 16 19 17 32 15 20 14 21 17 10 30 10 16 18 24 4 0
SpyBot.a 20 16 14 23 17 23 22 21 8 18 4 14 16 19 19 8 7 23 13 14 14 4 7
Welchia.a 6 6 6 10 12 10 13 12 5 6 4 5 18 5 3 42 3 15 0 0 4 0 7
Table 4.7: Malware Similarity Matrix
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4.10.3 Analyzing the Similarity Matrix
It is very hard to analyze the large similarity matrix, so we extracted some
of the more interesting information here.
In most cases, malwares are more similar to later variants of the same fam-
ily than to the earlier variants. This gives us more confidence that we can













Figure 4.10: Top Three Most













Figure 4.11: Top Three Most
Similar Malwares To Sober
Family Variants
We can see from Figure 4.10 and 4.11 that in the LovGate and Sober fam-
ilies, the variants within the same family have higher similarity index than
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Figure 4.12: Top Three Most













Figure 4.13: Top Three Most
Similar Malwares To Klez Fam-
ily Variants
But in the Bagle family, Bagle.a is more similar to Zafi.a than Bagle.at. In
the Klez family, Klez.h is more similar to Ganda than Klez.a, and Klez.e
has the same similarity index for both Klez.h and Zafi.a. In these anoma-
lies, the similarity indexes for these intra-family malwares are higher than
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the average.
We believe that there are two main possibilities for this anomaly. The first
and most likely possibility is that the Similarity Index we used was too
simple to study the intricate behavioral relationships between malwares.
Modifying the Similarity Index equation based on the previously proposed
suggestions in Section 4.10.2 will result in a more accurate score, and may
correct this problem.
The second possibility is that the current classification scheme is unsuitable
for our behavior-based approach, and a new paradigm is required. This can
be the focus of our future work.
Chapter 5
Experimental Methodology
5.1 Choice of Sensor
5.1.1 Experimental Objectives
The aim of our experiment is to get the list of behaviors described in
Section 4.4 that we are interested in. The choice of the sensor is very
important as it directly affects how we analyze the malware behaviors. We
imposed the following criteria for our choice:
• Must be able to capture information on most of the behaviors
• Data output must be semantically rich enough to reveal higher level
behaviors
• Data output must be in format flexible enough to allow statistical
analysis
• Must not impact system performance too much
• Must not adversely affect “normal” malware operations
5.1.2 Static Analysis versus Dynamic Monitoring
The first decision that we have to make is to choose to either perform static
analysis on the malware binary without executing it, or actually execute





Static analysis of a malware binary let us find out exactly how a malware
work, the resources that it uses, and the objects it carries within its pay-
load (files, scripts, HTML, GUI, passwords, commands, control channels,
and so on). The API system calls used by the malware can also be reverse
engineered from the binary, for example using SAVE [59] (Static Analyzer
for Vicious Executable). Most anti-virus solutions use this approach.
The problem with static analysis is that it is not very effective against
polymorphic or metamorphic malwares. While it is possible to recover the
code portions that polymorphic malwares attempts to hide via encryption
or encoding by studying the API system calls used by the binary, there is no
quantitative study to show its effectiveness. Also, the general consensus on
the effectiveness of this approach against metamorphic malwares is dismay.
Metamorphic malwares constantly mutates its payload by using different
registers, inserting junk code like no operations (NOP’s), and jumping over
(JMP) or rearranging code segments.
Dynamic Monitoring
Dynamic monitoring does not have the same problem with polymorphic or
metamorphic malwares. No matter how much the binary code changes, the
actions of the malware do not change. Since we look at behaviors, the few
ways for the malware to escape detection are by not performing any known
malicious actions, performing only novel actions, or taking out the sensor
system before its own detection. (Protection of the detection system is not
covered within the scope of this thesis)
The weakness of dynamic monitoring is that it might not capture all the
behaviors of the malware. Some behaviors might require certain conditions
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to be met before activation. For example, a malware might only perform
destructive actions on the hard drive or engage in a DOS attack only on
certain dates. A multi-vector malware might need certain software to be
installed in order to propagate in a different way; for example, a mass
mailer virus that can also be spread via the Kazaa distributed peer-to-peer
file sharing service.
We choose to use dynamic monitoring because it relates well to our behavior-
based approach and we hope to implement a real-time behavior-based de-
tection system in the future. Despite its weakness, we believe that it is
a good guide to malware behaviors and it can complement static analysis
well. Finally, it is our assumption that we do not need to catch all the
malware behaviors for detection or classification.
5.1.3 Sensor Level
The next question that we have to ask is where do we monitor, and how
much sensor details do we want. Let us look at the following three levels:
• Instruction set level
• System call level
• Application level
Instruction Set Level
The trade-off is that at the lower instruction set level, we have higher
coverage but lower semantic information. That means, it will be harder for
malwares to hide from the sensor, but it will also mean that it is harder to
get high-level behavioral information from the large stream of instruction
codes that will be generated from the monitoring.
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Application Level
At the higher application level, we have lower coverage but higher seman-
tic information. Windows itself provides Windows Event, Security and
Application logs, and performance counters that provides a good source of
information. Unfortunately, the lack of details and flexibility of these tools
makes them a bad sensor choice.
There are also a number of tools that we can use to look for specific be-
haviors. For example, Sysinternals offers a great range of tools that can
study a lot of different Windows behaviors in real-time; like Filemon [48]
that monitors all file system activities, or Regmon [49] that monitors all
registry activities. These tools can offer very specific and detailed behav-
ioral information with just a small amount of generated data.
The downside of using these tools is that every new behavior that we want
to cover requires additional tools. We lose flexibility, as we must know
exactly what behaviors we want before our experiments. Furthermore, it
is very hard to correlate information from different tools accurately.
System Call Level
The middle ground between the instruction set and application level is the
system call level. At this level, we look at information that passes from the
process to the kernel: system call names, arguments, and result values. In
many cases, system calls happen at a relatively low frequency compared to
machine instructions.
Another reason to choose the system call level is because of our assumption
that malware writers want portability, like most Win32 developers. Most
of the malwares discussed in Section 4.1 are written in C or Visual Basic,
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which are highly dependent on shared libraries or APIs that are common
over different versions of Windows. It is likely that similar system calls will
be used by these common APIs.
Many intrusion detection research on Unix based systems uses API system
calls for their sensor. That is because Unix has a small set of API system
calls that is open and well documented. These system calls combine to form
complex actions. On the other hand, Windows provides a large set of APIs
and system calls where the same function can be accomplished via several
different ways using different system calls. To ensure back-compatibility,
the number of Windows APIs and the system calls within these APIs are
increasing at every upgrade.
While we acknowledge that it is difficult to extract behaviors fromWindows
system calls, this level provides the best trade-off in terms of capabilities
and coverage.
5.2 Windows Internal Architecture
The details of the internal workings of Windows, especially NT’s architec-
ture, are beyond the scope of this thesis. We will discuss some relevant
details under the assumption that the reader has some familiarity with
Windows. We refer the interested reader to Russinovich’s books [39, 42]
for more details.
The Windows NT’s architecture consists of two main layers: user and ker-
nel. The mode of a process depends on which layer it is working in. Pro-
cesses in the user mode have limited rights to system resources, while the
kernel mode has unrestricted access to the system memory and external
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Figure 5.1: Windows API Call
To provide access from the user to kernel mode, Microsoft provides several
user subsystems. The most common one is the Win32 API, while others
include the OS/2 and POSIX API. But there is a hidden API that NT uses
internally, the Native API. This API is obfuscated from most programmers,
with hardly any documentation provided by Microsoft. The Windows NT
Native API is used to call operating system services located in kernel mode
from the user mode by higher level APIs such as the Win32, OS/2, POSIX,
Winsock or .NET APIs. An example of an application level API call is
shown in Figure 5.1. The technical details of the Native API are beyond
the scope of this paper, and we refer the reader to [38] for more detailed
information.
5.3 Choice of API Level Monitoring
The next problem we face is choosing the API to monitor. From the dis-
cussion in Section 5.2, we can roughly separate the APIs into two groups:
the higher level shared library APIs, and the lower level native API.
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• subsystem (Win32, OS/2, POSIX) and application (Winsock, .NET)
• native
Our choice is to either monitor only the native API, or all the APIs.
5.3.1 Advantages of Native API
Higher level shared library APIs (Win32, OS/2, POSIX) must interface to
kernel via the lower level native API, thus the coverage is very wide for
the native API. In fact, hooks in the native API can provide global control
over the system.
As even assembly-based programs trigger native API system calls when
performing functions such as accessing files, it is very hard for most mal-
wares to hide from such a low level sensor. While it is possible to write
malwares that do not use standard API calls [4], doing so is very difficult
and will break any compatibility between Windows versions.
Finally, the performance hit to the system for monitoring all the APIs is
very high. When we first experimented with Rohitab’s API Monitor [37] to
capture system calls from all APIs, the system slowed down until it crashes
when we ran the Welchia worm. Since we hope to implement a real-time
detection system in the future, we cannot afford to monitor all the APIs.
5.3.2 Limitations of Native API
The main disadvantage of monitoring native API is that we can only see
what the malware ask the operating system to do. The decision-making
process, or logic, of the malware cannot be inferred from the system calls.
In addition, system calls from other higher-level APIs such as Winsock are
not monitored, so we cannot get detailed information about the network
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traffic. But the native API does provide clues that indicate network activ-
ities. For example, in a number of traces, any successful NtCreateFile call
to the “\Device\RasAcd” device is indicative of SMTP activity.
Finally, the native API is not as descriptive as the higher level APIs. For
example, the single CopyFile() Win32 API need to be represented by a
sequence of native API system calls.
5.4 Chosen Implementation
We would like to extract host behaviors from Native API system calls alone.
The tool we have chosen to implement is based on BindView’s strace for
NT [12], as the source code of strace is available under Open Source license.
While our ultimate aim is to modify strace to serve as a real-time defense
module, we will capture all the data to disk so that we can work off-line
for now.
To show the reader the output format of strace, we quote the following
from strace’s readme file:
1 133 139 NtOpenKey (0x80000000, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\Registry\Machine [...]
2 133 139 NtCreateEvent (0x100003, 0x0, 1, 0, ... 8, ) == 0x0
3 133 139 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1243984, 0, 1244028, 8192, 4, ... ) == 0x0
4 133 139 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1243980, 0, 1244032, 4096, 4, ... ) == 0x0
5 133 139 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1243584, 0, 1243644, 4096, 4, ... ) == 0x0
6 133 139 NtOpenDirectoryObject (0x3, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\KnownDlls"}, ... 12, )
== 0x0
7 133 139 NtOpenSymbolicLinkObject (0x1, {24, 12, 0x40, 0, 0, "KnownDllPath"}, ...
16, ) == 0x0
8 133 139 NtQuerySymbolicLinkObject (16, ... "C:\WINNT\system32", 0x0, ) == 0x0
9 133 139 NtClose (16, ... ) == 0x0
...
The first column is an identity, which lets you match up calls
that don’t complete immediately (and are broken onto two lines).
The second and third columns are the process and thread ids of
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the thread making the call. Next is the name of the system call,
the input parameters, three dots (...), then output parameters,
and the return code.
5.5 Experimental Environment
5.5.1 Virtualization versus Emulation
There are advantages and disadvantages to both virtualization and emula-
tion of the platform.
Emulation, or sandboxing, allows us better control because the malware
binary is not executed in a real environment, but within a “jail” operating
system emulated by software. Thus, it is possible to monitor both native
and application system calls. It is also more convenient when we want
to capture the system call traces from a large batch of malwares. Unfor-
tunately, emulated environments are extremely restrictive: adding in new
programs or implementing complex network services that interact with the
sandbox can be very troublesome.
Virtualization, on the other hand, emulates a PC and the operating system
is installed within a virtual machine. From the operating system’s point
of view, everything from the hardware to the network environment is real.
This means we can install whatever software we want, and the network
configuration is decoupled from the virtual machine.
We acknowledge that some malwares might change their behaviors or do
not activate, if they detect the virtual environment. This is to prevent
attempts at reverse engineering the malwares. The most common way to
detect virtualization is by checking the hardware configurations as most
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virtualization software uses fixed names for the virtual hardware. There
are no solutions at this time, but vendors such as VMWare are working to
rectify this flaw in their products.
5.5.2 Platform Operating System
As we decided to study Windows malwares, we have to decide which ver-
sion to run the malwares on. The possible versions of Windows that we
could use are shown in Table 5.1.
The research platform we chose for the victim is the Windows 2000. The
first reason is because next to Windows XP, Windows 2000 is the second
most deployed version in both the home user and corporate market. The
second reason is because this operating system was targeted by a large
number of malwares in the past, and is still targeted in newer attacks in
addition to Windows XP. A number of older malwares may not exhibit all
their behaviors in XP. The large amount of available malwares is important
in the study of behaviors.
Year 199319941995 1996 1997 199819992000 2003 2005
Home User - - - 95 95 98 98 ME, XP -
Market OSR2 OSR2.1, SE XP (MC)
OSR2.5
Enterprise NT NT NT NT - - - 2000 2003 2003
Market 3.1 3.5 3.51 4.0 R2
Table 5.1: Versions of Microsoft Windows
5.5.3 Network Configuration
To prevent any accidental release of malwares during experiment, virtual
machines are used within a single host PC to simulate an isolated network
environment. VMWare Workstation [51] is the virtualization software used
to provide a victim guest running Windows 2000 Professional and a Gate-
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way providing faked network services running Fedora Core 4 Linux.
Windows 2000 VM Guest
Victim
192.168.1.33







Figure 5.2: Experiment Virtual Network Diagram
The services provided by the Gateway are:
• DNS Server resolving all URL to a single address
• Sendmail mail server
• dovecot IMAP server
• samba file server providing Windows Network Share
In addition, the Gateway also runs honeyd [34], a low interaction honey-
pot that responds to any IP addresses simulating Windows 2000 with the
following services:
• NetBIOS service
• MS Exchange POP3 service
• MS Exchange NNTP service
• MS Exchange IMAP service
• MS Exchange SMTP service
• LDAP service
• IIS Web server
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• MS ftp service
• VNC service
In future work, we plan to add in a dummy Windows 2000 VMWare guest
that had a previous file share relation with the victim because none of the
malwares attacked the samba file server. We also plan to include fake IRC
and P2P servers.
5.5.4 Honeytokens: Email Addresses and Files
To coax the full set of email behaviors from malwares, we can use the con-
cept of honeytokens. Honeytoken [45] is a system resource whose value lies
in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource. In this case, we can create
fake email addresses that the malwares can find and propagate to.
To make sure the generated fake addresses are used by as many malwares
as possible, we can make use of the descriptions from the anti-virus com-
panies that include patterns that malwares avoid. See Table 5.2 for some
examples.
Bagle.a @hotmail.com, @msn.com, @microsoft, @avp, .r1
Bagle.z abuse, admin, anyone@, @avp., bsd, bugs@, ...
LovGate.ad .gov, .mil, accoun, acketst, admin, arin., ...
Mydoom.a @*.gov, @*.mil, @*acketst*, ... , *accoun*@, *anyone*@, ...
Sober.f @arin, @foo., @iana, @ikarus., @kaspers, @messagelab, ...
Table 5.2: Examples of Email Patterns Avoided by Malwares
In addition to putting these fake addresses in the Outlook or Windows Ad-
dress Books, we can also embed them in files that the malwares can find.
Rather than to randomly place and name these files, we can refine the
location and file names using the anti-virus company descriptions as well.
Table 5.3 shows some examples of file extensions searched by the malwares.
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As these files are honeytokens and should not be accessed by any legal pro-
grams, any file read or load is highly suspicious and can provide another
behavioral function that we can use.
Bagle.a wab, txt, htm, html
Bagle.z adb, asp, cfg, cgi, dbx, dhtm, eml, htm, jsp, mbx, mdx, ...
Ganda eml, *htm*, dbx
Gibe.a bmp, cpp, doc, htm, html, jpg, mpeg, mpg, txt, xls
Klez.a asp, htm, html, php
Klez.h asp, bak, c, cpp, doc, htm, html, jpg, mp3, mpeg, mpg, ...
Lentin.a htm*
LovGate.a ht*
LovGate.ad adb, asp, dbx, htm, php, pl, sht, tbb, TXT, wab
Lovelorn.a EML, dbx, htm, *ITEM, *BOX
Mydoom.a adb, asp, dbx, htm, php, pl, sht, tbb, txt, wab
Sober.a abc, ade, adp, asp, cfg, doc, dsp, dsw, eml, fdb, htm, ...
Sober.f abc, abd, abx, adb, ade, adp, adr, asp, bas, cfg, cgi, ...
Sobig.a dbx, eml, htm, html, txt, wab
Table 5.3: Examples of File Extensions Searched by Malwares
5.6 Experimental Progress
To test the feasibility of using the behaviors to detect malwares, we look
at some of the most common malwares and normal applications to date.
For each malware, we traced its live activity for fifteen minutes, more than
enough time for any recurrent behaviors to surface. While we do not claim
any of the traces to be representative of normal activities, these traces have
been gathered in environments as deterministic as possible. We believe
that they can help us detect malware behaviors by providing a baseline of
activities.
5.6.1 Traces of Common or Commercial Applications
To have a baseline to compare malware against, traces of the following ap-
plications common to most home users and office workers were captured
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and analyzed. This baseline comparison is very important in the study of
false positives rates for our approach.
For the normal applications, we used the host as any normal user would
have, and traced its execution using various lengths of time depending on
the action we are trying to capture, from five to fifteen minutes. For some
actions like the browsing the Internet, the target system is connected to
a live network. Other actions that do not require Internet access are re-
stricted to our isolated network. The applications used and actions taken
are shown in Table 5.4.
Programs Actions
Adobe Acrobat Reader 6 Open file in Explorer.
Ghostgum GhostScript Viewer 4.7 Open file in Explorer.
Internet Explorer 5.0.2920.0 Normal browsing.
ICQ Messenger 2001b Build 3659 Connect to server.
MSN Messenger 5.0 Connect to server.
Windows Media Player 6.4.9.1109 Open file in Explorer and from URL.
Nullsoft Winamp Audio Player 5.094 Open file in Explorer.
Microsoft Access 2000 9.0.0.2719 Open file in Explorer, Save file.
Microsoft Excel 2000 9.0.0.2719 Open file in Explorer, Save file.
Microsoft Outlook 2000 9.0.0.2416 Receive/send mail with IMAP.
Microsoft Powerpoint 2000 9.0.0.2716 Open file in Explorer, Save file.
Microsoft Word 2000 9.0.0.2717 Open file in Explorer, Save file.
Microsoft FrontPage 2000 4.0.2.2717 Open file in Explorer, Save file.
WinZip 7.0 Open file in Explorer, Uncompress file.
WinRAR 3.3 Open file in Explorer, Uncompress file.
Table 5.4: Normal Applications Studied
5.6.2 Traces of Malwares
We attempted to capture the traces of all twenty-four malwares discussed in
Section 4.2. We encountered some problems in trying to capture the traces
of certain malwares. These problems include: malware samples unable to
execute on our virtual machine (possibly because of damaged binaries), in-
compatibility with the strace monitoring program (malware process dies if
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being monitored), and failure of the malware to launch its payload.
Because of these problems, we only managed to successfully obtain traces
of eleven malwares as shown in Table 5.5.
Malwares Status Comments
Email-Worm.Win32.Bagle.a FAIL fail to replicate.




Email-Worm.Win32.Gibe.a FAIL fail to replicate.
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.a FAIL clash with sensor.
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.e FAIL fail to activate.
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.h FAIL fail to activate.




Email-Worm.Win32.LovGate.ad FAIL fail to replicate.
Email-Worm.Win32.Mimail.a SUCCESS




Email-Worm.Win32.Sobig.a FAIL fail to replicate.
Email-Worm.Win32.Zafi.a FAIL fail to activate.
Net-Worm.Win32.Welchia.a SUCCESS
P2P-Worm.Win32.SpyBot.a FAIL fail to activate.
Worm.Win32.Lovesan.a FAIL fail to replicate.
Table 5.5: Trace Capture Status of Malwares Studied
Chapter 6
Behavior Modeling
One difficulty faced by our behavioral approach is how to extract mean-
ingful behaviors from system call traces. A single software behavior can be
called using different combinations of API system calls, so one behavioral
function could be represented by many different API sequences.
The problem is that if we only look at a limited set of sequences to represent
a behavioral function, we would not be able to recognize all the different
sequences of equivalent behavior. And as the collection of sequences to
represent one behavior may be very large, we require a better method of
behavior detection than looking for frequent patterns within the system
call traces.
In this chapter, we will attempt to show how to model behaviors from se-
quences of system calls.
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6.1 Recap of Anomaly-based Systems using
System Calls
From what we had seen in Section 3.1, a large number of intrusion de-
tection system research use system calls as proxy for the host’s behavior.
Typically, fixed or variable sliding windows of system call event sequences
are used as the basic unit, and are assigned values representing normalcy
or abnormality, using various data mining techniques.
S101 S102 S103 S104 S105 S106 S107S100S99S98 S108
S101 S102 S103 S104 S105 S106 S107S100S99S98 S108
time = t
time = t + 1
Figure 6.1: API System Call Event Sequence with Sliding Window of 5
These values are then used to compute numerical results, whereby a value
over a predefined threshold represents the probability of normal behavior
or intrusion.
6.2 Behavioral Blocks
From the analysis of the raw system call traces, we observed that some
individual API system calls could be used to infer certain behaviors, while
other behaviors require an entire sequence. For example, the checking of
date or time can be accomplished with a single NtQuerySystemTime call.
In this thesis, we will refer to the sequence of system calls that infer be-
haviors as a block.
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Because of the multi-tasking and multi-threading nature of the Windows
operating system, the system call events generated by different processes
are interleaved together. Application or system programs spawn processes
and different tasks of the process are assigned to different threads within
the process. As threads do the actual work, the sequence of system call
events in each thread are in sequential order. By looking at the system call
traces at the thread level, it allows us a more manageable way to look for
behaviors.
Sall = {A1,1[1], A1,2[2], A1,3[3], A2,1[4], A3,1[5], A2,2[6], ..., AP,T [D]}
S1,1 = {A1,1[1], A1,1[2], A1,1[3], A1,1[4], A1,1[5], A1,1[6], ...}
...
S3,1 = {A3,1[1], A3,1[2], A3,1[3], A3,1[4], A3,1[5], A3,1[6], ...}
where
S - sequence of API system call events,
AP,T [D] - system call event of process P and thread T , at delta time D.
6.2.1 Delimiters
We will use delimiters provided by the format structure of Windows’ Na-
tive API to construct a block, instead of using a sliding window.
The delimiter to end a block is always the NtClose system call, while
the delimiter to begin the block depends on the object being manipu-
lated. For example, File blocks begin with the system call NtCreateFile
or NtOpenFile; Registry blocks with NtCreateKey or NtOpenKey; and so
on. Please refer to Table 6.1 for more examples. The sequence of system
calls within the block are linked by their Object Handles.
80
Object Begin Delimiter Object Handles
File NtCreateFile, NtOpenFile FileHandle
Registry NtCreateKey, NtOpenKey KeyHandle
Memory NtCreateSection, NtOpenSection SectionHandle
Mutex NtCreateMutant, NtOpenMutant MutantHandle
Process NtCreateProcess, NtOpenProcess ProcessHandle
Event NtCreateEvent, NtOpenEvent EventHandle
Thread NtCreateThread, NtOpenThread ThreadHandle
Table 6.1: Examples of Begin Delimiter System Calls
As Windows treats resources like file, memory or network points as objects,
the block can be used to model behaviors manipulating different types of
resources in a similar fashion.
6.2.2 Block Property
A system call event consists of: an unique identifier or counter, process ID
(PID), thread ID (TID), input and/or output arguments and return sta-
tus. Within a block, a system call is able to access all the input and output
information of its preceding system call events, and manipulate the objects
initialized by those system calls according to the access rights granted. We
will show this property with an example.
In Figure 6.2, we see that five system calls are linked by the same Object
Handle 752. Therefore, these five system calls form a block.
Blockunknown = {NtCreateF ile,NtSetInformationF ile,NtWriteF ile,
NtSetInformationF ile,NtClose}
From Figure 6.4, the NtCreateFile event creates a new file
“C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Ahead Nero 7.exe”.
This information can be seen from the input arguments CreateDisposition
(FILE CREATE) and ObjectName. This file is initialized as a file object with
write permission, and is referenced by the File Handle 752.
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140117 772 720 NtCreateFile (0x40110080, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 1242692,
"\??\C:\ProgramFiles\CommonFiles\MicrosoftShared\
AheadNero7.exe"}, 0x0, 128, 0, 2, 100, 0, 0, ... 752 ,
{status=0x0, info=2}, ) == 0x0
140118 772 720 NtSetInformationFile ( 752 , 1242728, 8, EndOfFile, ...
{status=0x0, info=0}, ) == 0x0
140119 772 720 NtCreateSection (0xf001f, 0x0, 0x0, 2, 134217728, 768, ...
756, ) == 0x0
140120 772 720 NtMapViewOfSection (756, -1, (0x0), 0, 0, {0, 0}, 0, 1, 0,
2, ... (0x2040000), 0, 0, 24576, ) == 0x0
140121 772 720 NtClose (756, ... ) == 0x0
140122 772 720 NtWriteFile ( 752 , 0, 0, 0, "MZ\0\0\1〈DELETED〉", 21358,
0x0, 0, ... {status=0x0, info=21358}, ) == 0x0
140123 772 720 NtUnmapViewOfSection (-1, 0x2040000, ... ) == 0x0
140124 772 720 NtSetInformationFile ( 752 , 1243632, 40, Basic, ...
{status=0x0, info=0}, ) == 0x0
140125 772 720 NtClose (768, ... ) == 0x0
140126 772 720 NtClose ( 752 , ... ) == 0x0













Output IoStatus status: 0x0
Arguments: Block: info: 21358
ReturnStatus: 0x0
SUCCESS










































Figure 6.4: NtCreateFile System Call Event from Bagle.ai Sample Trace
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When we look into the details of the NtWriteFile system call event from
Figure 6.3, we see that it successfully wrote data into the file referenced by
File Handle 752. It was able to access the all the information of the file
object created by the preceding NtCreateFile event.
6.3 Identification of Block Behavior
Without any advanced knowledge, it might seem that we would need a so-
phisticated learning algorithm to learn the behavior of a block; but by un-
derstanding the workings of Windows [42] and the native system call API,
it makes behavior identification easier. In most cases, the blocks them-
selves provide enough information to identify the functions they serve. By
studying the system calls used [31, 33], and the source code from the Win-
dows Driver Development Kit [28], we were able to identify a large number
of behavioral blocks. We will demonstrate the process with an example of
how we identify a file write behavior from the trace in Figure 6.5.
2098 816 764 NtCreateFile (0xc0100080, {24, 0, 0x42, 0, 1240460, "\??\C:
\WINNT\System32\netdll.dll"}, 0x0, 32, 3, 1, 96, 0, 0, ...
92, {status=0x0, info=1}, ) == 0x0
2099 816 764 NtQueryVolumeInformationFile (92, 1240556, 8, Device, ...
{status=0x0, info=8}, ) == 0x0
2100 816 764 NtWriteFile (92, 0, 0, 0, "MZP\0\2\0\0\0\4\0\17\0\
377\377\0\0\270\0\4\0\0\0\0@\0\32\0", 28, 0x0, 0, ...
{status=0x0, info=28}, ) == 0x0
2101 816 764 NtClose (92, ...
2101 816 764 NtClose ... ) == 0x0














Output IoStatus status: 0x0
Arguments: Block: info: 28
ReturnStatus: 0x0
SUCCESS









Output IoStatus status: 0x0
Arguments: Block: info: 8
ReturnStatus: 0x0
SUCCESS











































Figure 6.8: NtCreateFile System Call Event from Lovelorn.a Sample Trace
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6.3.1 Detection
For certain behaviors, we noticed that we do not need to study every sys-
tem call that appears within a block. Depending on the behavior required,
some system call types can be ignored.
The trace and system call information presented previously in Section 6.3
shows the behavior of writing to a file.
Blockfile write = {NtCreateF ile,NtQueryV olumeInformationF ile,
NtWriteF ile,NtClose}
We know that if we see an NtWriteFile event in the block, a write opera-
tion was performed on the file ObjectName. Since the NtCreateFile event
input argument CreateDisposition is FILE OPEN, we know that an existing
file was written to, instead of creating a new file. The NtQueryVolumeInformationFile
event provides no useful information as we are convinced that the block per-
forms a file write.
Other examples in File operations include an NtSetInformationFile event
with input argument FileInformationClass of Disposition indicating a
file delete behavior.
We are trying to show that there is no need to study all the system call
events in a block. If we are looking for specific behaviors, certain system
call types can give us enough information.
6.3.2 Identification
Compared to simple detection, the criteria for identification are more strin-
gent. This is because the identified block behavior is used for classifying
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malwares. While the behaviors detected may be the same for some mal-
wares, how these behaviors were accomplished might be entirely different.
Identification is more complex because we have to look at all the system
calls and their parameters. Not only are the parameters of different system
calls are used differently, some parameters are more important than others.
We will demonstrate how we chose the parameters.
Let us take a look at the NtQueryVolumeInformationFile event from Fig-
ure 6.7, it has three input arguments excluding the FileHandle: FileSys-
temInformation, Length and FileSystemInformationClass. The two out-
put arguments, status and info, do not matter because they reflect the
values from Length and ReturnStatus respectively. The input argument
FileSystemInformationClass is Device, which tells us that it tried to get
information about the volume device containing “netdll.dll”. FileSystem-
Information is a buffer, and Length is the size of the buffer, so these two
arguments do not provide us with much information and can be discounted.
From Figure 6.6, the NtWriteFile event has seven input arguments ex-
cluding the FileHandle: Event, ApcRoutine, ApcContext, Buffer, Length,
ByteOffset and Key. The two output arguments, status and info, do not
matter because they also reflect the values from Length and ReturnStatus
respectively. Of all the input arguments, only Buffer and Length are not
optional arguments that can be discounted. The Buffer argument shows
part of the binary data to be written, and Length is the size of Buffer.
These two arguments do not provide us with more information and can be
discounted too.
Finally, let us take a look at Figure 6.8 showing the NtCreateFile event. It
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has nine input arguments: DesiredAccess, ObjectAttributes, AllocationSize
FileAttributes, ShareAccess, CreateDisposition, CreateOptions, EaBuffer,
EaLength. The two output arguments, status and info, do not matter
because they reflect the values from CreateDisposition and the ReturnSta-
tus respectively. AllocationSize and EaBuffer are optional arguments and
can be discounted. As EaLength is the size of EaBuffer, we can disregard
this argument too. ObjectAttributes is a buffer, containing the following
arguments: Length, RootDirectory, Attributes, SecurityDescriptor, Secu-
rityQualityOfService and ObjectName. We only need RootDirectory and
ObjectName to know what Object we are accessing, but these are not re-
quired to determine behaviors.
Of the remaining five input arguments, we can disregard DesiredAccess and
ShareAccess, which provides the access rights to the file because NtWriteFile
must be successful for this block to be true. We also disregard FileAt-
tributes because knowing the changed file attribute information does not
contribute more data in this case. We are interested in CreateDisposition,
which tells us the file we are accessing is an existing file, and CreateOptions
that tells us the file object is not a directory.
As this is the ninth file write block we had encountered, we will name it
file write9. The system call events and arguments needed to represent
file write9 are shown in Figure 6.9.
As the sequence of system call events gets longer and more varied, the
more complex the behaviors become. As this is a new area of research, the
choosing of parameters to identify a block is done by a human expert. At
this time, we have not found any algorithmic method to accomplish this as
we are still in the infancy of our work.
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NtCreateFile
FileAttributes: FILE ATTRIBUTE ARCHIVE
CreateDisposition: FILE OPEN
CreateOptions: FILE SYNCHRONOUS IO NONALERT








Figure 6.9: System Call Events and Arguments Representing file write9
We would like to reiterate the importance of choosing the right combina-
tions of parameters. If we use too few parameters, we would likely lose
some context about the behavior. For example in this section, we chose
not to use the FileAttributes argument in the file write9 block. This
means we lose the information that the file access rights was changed, but
as we are identifying write behavior, this information is not important.
On the other hand, if we use too many parameters, we lose the ability to
generalize. If we encounter another similar block with minor difference in
parameters like the desired access rights, we would have to create another
identification signature with minor differences.
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6.4 Matching Blocks with Finite State Au-
tomata
6.4.1 Block FSA
We use finite state automata to model block information because they en-
able efficient behavior function identification. Using FSAs to perform pat-
tern matching on blocks allows us flexibility in the software implementation
as FSA can be implemented using regular expressions, which is supported
in many programming languages.
In our implementation, the three different transitions are the System Call
name (SYSCALL), the arguments (ARG), and the return status (RET) of
the event. We will use the file write9 block from the previous section for
illustration. The information from the block of system call events in the
previous Figure 6.9 is represented in Figure 6.10.
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Figure 6.10: file write9 Block FSA
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6.4.2 Generalized Block FSA
In longer block patterns, we notice that there are a lot of repetitions within
the blocks. By finding frequent patterns within the blocks, we can gener-
alize one FSA to model similar blocks.
We will look at the simplified representation of Blockfile write9 below. This
block can be modeled with the FSA shown in Figure 6.10. The differ-
ence between Blockfile write9 and Blockfile write89 is the repetition of the
NtWriteFile event.
Blockfile write9 = {NtCreateF ile,NtQueryV olumeInformationF ile,
NtWriteF ile,NtClose}
Blockfile write89 = {NtCreateF ile,NtQueryV olumeInformationF ile,
NtWriteF ile,NtWriteF ile,NtWriteF ile,NtWriteF ile,
NtWriteF ile,NtWriteF ile,NtWriteF ile,NtWriteF ile,
NtWriteF ile,NtWriteF ile,NtWriteF ile,NtWriteF ile,
NtWriteF ile,NtClose}
By slightly modifying the FSA to include an additional transition from the
return status state of NtWriteFile back to itself, as shown in Figure 6.11,
this FSA can be used to model both Blockfile write9 and Blockfile write89.
A more complicated FSA is shown in Figure 6.12. At this time, the process
of sequence reduction using frequent patterns is done manually. We hope
to study various algorithms for this process in future works.
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Figure 6.11: Generalized
file write9 Block FSA
Figure 6.12: Generalized
file read5 Block FSA
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6.5 Behavioral Macros
The basic unit to represent behaviors is the individual system call events.
A structured sequence of system call events is a block. When blocks are
combined to form more complex behaviors, we call them macros.
We will introduce three main types of block relationship within a macro:
interleave, intersect and super.
6.5.1 Interleaving Blocks
Interleave is the simplest relationship. The two blocks or macros share no
direct relationship or information, other than the fact that the sequences
of both are sequentially interleaving.
We refer to Figure 6.13, which is a representation of the traces from Fig-
ure 6.14. The macro file copy is formed from the file write block and











Figure 6.13: Bagle.at File Copy Macro Behavior
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Block Trace
1 2877 764 740 NtCreateFile (0x80100080, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 1242960, ”\?
?\C:\Email-Worm.Win32.Bagle.at.exe”}, 0x0, 0, 1, 1,
2097252, 0, 0, ... 448, status=0x0, info=1, ) == 0x0
...
1 2885 764 740 NtQueryInformationFile (448, 1242864, 4, Ea, ...
{status=0x0, info=4}, ) == 0x0
2 2886 764 740 NtCreateFile (0x40110080, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 1242852, ”\?
?\C:\WINNT\System32\wingo.exe”}, 0x0, 33, 0, 5, 100,
0, 0, ... 444, {status=0x0, info=2}, ) == 0x0
2 2889 764 740 NtSetInformationFile (444, 1242888, 8, EndOfFile, ...
{status=0x0, info=0}, ) == 0x0
1,3 2892 764 740 NtCreateSection (0xf001f, 0x0, 0x0, 2, 134217728, 448,
... 452, ) == 0x0
3 2893 764 740 NtMapViewOfSection (452, -1, (0x0), 0, 0, {0, 0}, 0, 1,
0, 2, ... (0xcf0000), {0, 0}, 20480, ) == 0x0
3 2894 764 740 NtClose (452, ... ) == 0x0
2 2895 764 740 NtWriteFile (444, 0, 0, 0, ”BINARY DATA”, 19069, 0x0,
0, ... {status=0x0, info=19069}, ) == 0x0
2896 764 740 NtUnmapViewOfSection (-1, 0xcf0000, ... ) == 0x0
2 2897 764 740 NtSetInformationFile (444, 1243792, 40, Basic, ...
{status=0x0, info=0}, ) == 0x0
1 2900 764 740 NtClose (448, ... ) == 0x0
2 2901 764 740 NtClose (444, ... ) == 0x0
Figure 6.14: Extract of Email-Worm.Win32.Bagle.at Sample Trace
6.5.2 Intersecting Blocks
Intersecting blocks has the closest relationship. The two blocks or macros
share common system call events, in addition to the sequences of both se-
quentially interleaving.
From Figure 6.13, the macro file load is formed from the file open and
map to memory blocks. We can see from Figure 6.14 that they share the
NtCreateSection system call event.
6.5.3 Super Blocks
Super relationship is when one block or macro inherits objects or parameter
information from another, in addition to the sequences of both sequentially
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interleaving.
The traces from Figure 6.15 shows two blocks, where Block1 is the su-
per block of Block2. In Block1, the NtOpenKey event initialized a reg-
istry object “\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-515967899-299502267-839522115-
1000”, which is a registry path, referenced by the KeyHandle 76. In Block2,
the NtCreateKey event inherits the object via the handle 76. The path
of the previous object is combined with current ObjectName “SOFTWARE\




1 4603 772 720 NtOpenKey (0x2000000, 24, 0,
0x40, 0, 0, ”\REGISTRY\USER\
S-1-5-21-515967899-299502267-839522115-1000”,
... 76 , ) == 0x0
...
2 6052 772 720 NtCreateKey (0x2000000, 24, 76 , 0x40, 0, 0, ”SOFTWARE\
Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”, 0, 0x0, 0, ...
448, 2, ) == 0x0
2 6053 772 720 NtSetValueKey (448, ”key”, 0, 1, ”C\0:\0\\0W\0I\0N\0N\
0T\0\\0S\0y\0s\0t\0e\0m\03\02\0\\0w\0i\0n\0x\0p\
0.\0e\0x\0e\0\0\0”, 56, ... ) == 0x0
2 6054 772 720 NtClose (448, ... ) == 0x0
...
1 328060 772 720NtClose (76, ... ) == 0x0
Figure 6.15: Extract of Sample Trace from Bagle.ai
6.6 Mapping of Behaviors to Blocks
We have seen in Section 6.3.2 how we can identify simple blocks based on
the system call information. But identifying complex behaviors will require
more effort.
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While it is very hard to find behaviors from a system trace, it is much easier
to extract sequences from system trace if the behavior is known (for exam-
ple, if we know in advance a malware creates an identifier in the memory
to indicate it’s presence, we can analyze the system calls related to that
identifier to form a behavioral function).
Therefore, our approach is to find obscure blocks of system calls that in-
dicate the behaviors of the malwares based on the technical descriptions
from anti-virus companies we discussed in Section 4.3 and footprints left
behind from the actions taken by the malwares.
This approach is inspired by criminal profiling and medical differential di-
agnosis. An medical analogy we can use is that if a doctor suspects that
his patient have a very tiny tumor that cannot be seen by a MRI scan, he
can check the patient’s blood for certain antibodies that might indicate the
presence of a tumor.
Any actions taken by a process in a host leaves traces. In some cases,
preparations taken to undertake an action leave traces. For example, using
native API alone cannot accurately identify behaviors like network connec-
tions, we would need to monitor the Winsock API to get details. But by
looking for blocks involving network device objects or network DLLs, we
can get hints about network activities.
We will demonstrate this with the process of how we identified a code in-
jection macro. Code injection is a technique whereby we inject executable
code into an existing process. While it might seem like a bad idea for non-
malicious programs, it is used quite frequently.
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Block Trace
1 9114 220 824 NtOpenFile (0x100020, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\??\C:
\WINNT\system32\1.dll"}, 5, 96, ... 336, {status=0x0,
info=1}, ) == 0x0
1,2 9115 220 824 NtCreateSection (0xf, 0x0, 0x0, 16, 16777216, 336, ...
2 9115 220 824 NtCreateSection ... 560, ) == 0x0
1 9121 220 824 NtClose (336, ... ) == 0x0
2 9122 220 824 NtMapViewOfSection (560, -1, (0x0), 0, 0, 0x0,
0, 1, 0, 4, ... (0x1110000), 0x0, 86016, ) ==
STATUS IMAGE NOT AT BASE
I1 9123 220 824 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, (0x1111000), 45056, 4, ...
(0x1111000), 45056, 32, ) == 0x0
I2 9124 220 824 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, (0x111c000), 12288, 4, ...
(0x111c000), 12288, 2, ) == 0x0
I3 9125 220 824 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, (0x1123000), 8192, 4, ...
(0x1123000), 8192, 2, ) == 0x0
2 9126 220 824 NtMapViewOfSection (560, -1, (0x1110000),
0, 0, 0x0, 86016, 1, 0, 4, ... ) ==
STATUS CONFLICTING ADDRESSES
I4 9127 220 824 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, (0x1111000), 45056, 16, ...
(0x1111000), 45056, 4, ) == 0x0
I5 9128 220 824 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, (0x111c000), 12288, 2, ...
(0x111c000), 12288, 4, ) == 0x0
I6 9129 220 824 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, (0x1123000), 8192, 2, ...
(0x1123000), 8192, 8, ) == 0x0
I7 9130 220 824 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
2 9131 220 824 NtClose (560, ... ) == 0x0
Figure 6.16: code injection Extract of Sample LovGate.a Trace
From the technical description of Email-Worm.Win32.LovGate.a, we learn
that the malware does a code injection using the dynamic link library file
“1.dll”. By searching for the file in the trace, we found the macro as
shown in Figure 6.16. Block 2, interleaved with seven individual system
call events, shows sign of a code injection. The return status from the
two NtMapViewOfSection events, STATUS IMAGE NOT AT BASE and STATUS
CONFLICTING ADDRESSES, are the main indicators. We double-checked this
with Email-Worm.Win32.LovGate.b, and security applications like Spybot
- Search & Destroy and ClamWin Anti Virus, which are also known to use
code injections.
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6.7 Correlation of Behavior Blocks or Macros
We can gather more behavioral information when we look at the correla-
tions of blocks or macros. We will demonstrate with one example whereby
we get the behavior for searching all the directories on the local drive:
search all dir recursive.
The block behavior,
dir search2 "*" "\??\C:\"
represents the searching of all files in the "C:" root directory. From Ta-
ble 6.5, we can see that the search starts from "C:", and continues depth-
first from "C:\WINNT" all the way to "C:\Recycled", the last directory
on the drive. Thus, these behavioral function blocks are used to model
search all dir recursive.
Block Block Behavior Functions
Start End
5636 5651 dir search2 "*" "\??\C:\"
5680 5712 dir search2 "*" "\??\C:\WINNT\"
5723 6233 dir search2 "*" "\??\C:\WINNT\system32\"
6242 6252 dir search2 "*" "\??\C:\WINNT\system32\config\"
6452 6489 dir search2 "*" "\??\C:\WINNT\system32\drivers\"
6498 6502 dir search2 "*" "\??\C:\WINNT\system32\drivers\
etc\"
...
376585 376593 dir search2 "*" "\??\C:\ProgramFiles\WinZip\"
378849 378855 dir search2 "*" "\??\C:\Recycled\"
Table 6.5: dir search2 Blocks from Sober.f Sample Trace
Chapter 7
Malware Behavioral Analysis
In this chapter, we first demonstrate the detection capability of our system
using the most prevalent behaviors as discussed in Section 4.7. We also
introduce the generalization of behavioral functions by showing reuse of
basic behavioral blocks among malwares. In the rest of the chapter, we
will explore various issues important to our behavior-based approach.
7.1 Accuracy of Technical Descriptions from
Anti-virus Companies
One interesting piece of information that may interest many researchers is
the accuracy of the malware descriptions provided by anti-virus companies.
We will study the accuracy of the descriptions by looking for a small set of
described behaviors in the captured behavioral traces of a sample number
of malwares.
The more prevalent behaviors are the sample choices, and they are also
the behaviors that form the survive system reboot and find email
addresses complex behaviors. The sample malware choices are limited
to those we managed to capture successfully, as discussed in Section 5.6.2.
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They are Bagle.ai, Bagle.at, Ganda, LovGate.a, LovGate.b, Lovelorn.a,
Mimail.a, Sober.a, Sober.f, Sober.g and Welchia.a .
7.1.1 Recap of Behavioral Functions Used
The behavioral functions that we will use in our analysis were discussed
in the previous chapters, but we will provide a brief summary to help the
reader recall the details.
The complex functions of survive system reboot and find email addresses
are formed by combinations of the following behavioral functions with pa-
rameters offering risk differentiation:
• file copy others
• file copy System
• file copy Windows
• file create others
• file create System
• file create Windows
• registry modify shell
• registry add startup
• registry add service
• find data files
• search all dir recursive
• search specific dir recursive
• harvest emails
We will show the possible complex behaviors combinations using Boolean
notations.
For survive system reboot function:
• registry add startup AND ( file copy OR file create )
• registry add service AND ( file copy OR file create )
• registry modify shell AND ( file copy OR file create )
For find email addresses function:
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• search all dir recursive AND find data files
AND harvest emails
• search specific dir recursive AND find data files
AND harvest emails
The function file create is a basic behavior that creates a new file, while
file copy duplicates a file, to a certain directory. The parameters shown
are the target directories, where Windows is the “C:\Windows” folder, and
System is the “C:\Windows\System32” folder, of a Windows 2000 system.
Any other target directories are represented by others.
As a behavior-based system, the filenames of the created files are not di-
rectly used, but the filenames are used to show correlation to the registry-
based functions. Thus a survive system reboot function can only be con-
firmed if the file-based and registry-based functions operate on the same
files.
The function registry add adds data like file names and locations to
the registry, where the parameters are the locations of the target reg-
istry keys. The parameter startup is the location of the key that stores
information about the programs that should run during a Windows start
up cycle, and service stores information about the programs that should
run as services during boot time. Adding file information to these keys
will result in new programs activating when Windows starts up. The func-
tion registry modify modifies existing registry data. The parameter shell
stores information about which programs to run when files of certain exten-
sions are activated. For example, the default “txt” shell of a Windows 2000
system points to the notepad application. Changing the txtshell key data
will result in another program being called when text files are activated.
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The function search all dir recursive traverse through the entire filesys-
tem starting from the root directory “C:\”, whereas
search specific dir recursive starts from a specific directory.
The find data files function is used to represent the search of text,
html or other application data files. In the Windows environment, the
different file types are usually indicated by their extensions. This func-
tion must occur within the lifetime of a search all dir recursive or
search specific dir recursive function to be used to form the complex
find email addresses function.
The function harvest emails indicates the parsing of files for patterns
matching email addresses. This behavior can be achieve by many different
methods. For example, the Email-Worm.Win32.Sobig.a worm searches for
patterns within files using the regular expression:
[A-Za-z0-9]+[A-Za-z0-9 .-]+@(([A-Za-z0-9\-])+[.])+[A-Za-z]+
As there are many possible ways for the harvest emails function to occur,
we will exclude this function from the analysis presented in this section.
7.1.2 Discussion of Description Accuracy
By looking for the behaviors that form the survive system reboot and
find email addresses complex behaviors, we formed a behavioral func-
tions versus malwares matrix in Appendix D.1. From the matrix, we de-
rived Figure 7.1 which shows the percentage of correct versus wrong iden-
tification of behavioral functions among the malwares.
Based on the description from the anti-virus companies, we expected to
detect the twelve basic behaviors that form survive system reboot and
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Correctly Identified Wrongly Identified
Figure 7.1: Percentage of Correctly Detected Malware Behaviors
find email addresses 63 times from the traces of the eleven sample mal-
wares. The number of correctly detected behaviors is 53, and 10 expected
behaviors were not detected at all. We did not detect any additional be-
haviors. At this point, the accuracy is only about 84%.
As the numbers of malwares and behaviors used are statistically insignifi-
cant, we will not draw any conclusions.
7.2 Detection Capability
We would like to see how effective is the system in detecting the presence
of malwares. First, we look for malware behaviors in normal applications.
Using the functions in Section 7.1, we formed a behavioral functions versus
normal applications matrix in Appendix D.2. A summary of this matrix
can be seem in Figure 7.2, which shows that most normal applications
do not display behaviors similar to malwares. For example, only the ICQ
application attempts to restart itself at the next reboot by modifying the
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registry (registry_add startup), out of all these sample applications.








































Figure 7.3: Percentage of Detected Correlated survive system reboot Be-
haviors
Looking at Figure 7.3, we see that 100% of the malwares perform behav-
iors that allow themselves to be started at the next reboot while none of the
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applications do that. This shows that the survive system reboot func-
tion is indicative of malware presence. The details of distribution between




















Figure 7.4: Percentage of Detected Correlated find email addresses Behav-
iors
In Figure 7.4, we weakened the requirement for detecting the behavior of
harvesting email addresses from data files found on the host. Instead of
requiring the detection of the parsing process, we will accept the behavior
as detected if data files are opened or read while the process is searching
for files. This is represented by the file open and file read functions.
0% of the applications display this behavior, while 9 out of 11 malwares
do. The details can be found in Appendix D.4. The two malwares that do
not display this behavior are Mimail.a and Welchia.a. As Welchia.a is a
network worm, we did not expect it to exhibit any email propagation ac-
tivities anyway, but we did expect Mimail.a to display this behavior. From
further investigation of the traces, we find that Mimail.a only harvest the
email addresses from the Windows Address Book of the current user. This
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behavior will be added to refine our detection of find email addresses
behavior.
Therefore, we can use survive system reboot and find email addresses
as the main behavioral functions indicating the presence of malwares.
7.3 Generalization of Behaviors
To be able to stop newer malwares based on the behaviors of older mal-
wares, we must be able to generalize the detected behaviors. The gener-
alization depends in the reuse of basic blocks. If our assumption is wrong
and malware behaviors cannot be generalized, the basic behavior blocks
used should be unique to each malware. But if the basic blocks are shared
among malwares, then it provides confidence in our approach.
We will take a look at the blocks that form the file create behavior.
From Table 7.1, the file create behavior is formed by the file write9
block in all the three Sober variants. This can be generalized to detect the
file create behavior in Lovelorn.a, which also uses file write9. In an-
other example, the two LovGate variant uses the same file write6 block
for file create.
Malware Block
Sober.a file write9 "C:\WINNT\System32\similare.exe"
Sober.f file write9 "C:\WINNT\System32\winrundiag.exe"
Sober.g file write9 "C:\WINNT\System32\crypt32sys.exe"
Lovelorn.a file write9 "C:\NQHLL.exe"
LovGate.a file write6 "C:\WINNT\System32\WinRpcsrv.exe"
LovGate.b file write6 "C:\WINNT\System32\WinRpcsrv.exe"
Table 7.1: Blocks That Form the file create Behavior
In addition, we can also see from Figure 7.5 that the different file write
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blocks are shared among the eleven malwares.












Figure 7.5: Percentage of Malwares Sharing file write Blocks
7.4 Discussions About Behaviors
7.4.1 Importance of Behavior Functions
We noticed that some functions do not provide much information in our
behavior-based system, or poses some problems.
One example is the mutex create function. While unique mutex (mutual
exclusion) names like "MuXxXxTENYKSDesignedAsTheFollowerOfSkynet-D"
is a good identifier in a misuse-signature based system, the action of cre-
ating a mutex is not a good behavioral signature because most processes
create mutexes with various names.
We face another problem with detecting the behavior of malwares killing
anti-virus processes. From the sample traces we have, the malwares all
109
enumerate the processes first, instead of wildly killing non-existent pro-
grams. The decision to kill the processes is in the program logic, which is
not visible from the API system call. That means we will not be able to
detect the kill process behavior unless the correct anti-virus or firewall
programs are running in the system.
7.4.2 New Behavior: Repeated Functions
From a simple system call sequence trace, we cannot see repeating API se-
quences easily. But when formed into blocks, we can see a lot of repeating
behavior blocks like the registry add functions in the two Bagle malwares
shown in Table 7.2 and 7.3.
Freq PID TID Function










Table 7.2: Frequency of registry add Functions in Bagle.ai
Freq PID TID Function










Table 7.3: Frequency of registry add Functions in Bagle.at
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In other systems studying malware behaviors, they only care about the first
behavior function that succeeds. But this provides us with the opportunity
to study a new behavior.
Why does Bagle.ai need to repeat that one particular behavior 8,234 times
within fifteen minutes? The first time is at identity 6,053, and the rest is
from 142,746 to 264,331, at almost random intervals. Other than Bagle.ai,
this behavior is only seen in Bagle.at among all the malware sample traces.
Our preliminary hypothesis is that it is a crude attempt to ensure that the
registry key to allow the malware itself to be started at the next boot time
is not changed by other malwares or anti-virus systems.
We can use this pattern of repeating functions as a new behavioral function.
It will be interesting to see if we can see even more repeating behaviors after
we combine correlated blocks into macros.
7.4.3 Consideration About Processes
In most older research systems using system calls as the sensor, they do not
care about the inter-process and inter-thread relationships. This is because
most older virus actions are contained within a single process spawned from
the original infection. But it is crucial to understand the inter-process and
inter-thread relationships of the newer malwares as they are no longer re-
stricted to just one process. The malwares that we had analyzed create
other processes to do different work. We think that it is to prevent detec-
tion, as a single process performing multiple virus-like behavioral functions
is more likely to arouse suspicion.
To monitor inter-process communications, we first have to look at the two
“correct” ways. In most cases, the original process will create a sub-process
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to do its work by means of process creation (NtCreateProcess and NtCre-
ateThread). The other way is by means of LPC (Local/Lightweight Proce-
dure Call), which is an inter-process communication mechanism provided
by Windows. These two ways of monitoring are relatively straightforward.
The problem is code injection. Detecting code injection is hard, and it is
difficult to find out which process was affected. In the past, it is only nec-
essary to monitor related processes for malware behaviors. But with code
injection, we would need to correlate information from seemingly unrelated
processes too.
We now face the additional problem of deciding the weightage for the re-
lationship of behavioral functions in different processes.
7.4.4 New Local Infection Trend
One of the interesting trends that we learned from studying the malware
behaviors is that out of the twelve sample malwares, only one search for
and infects executable files.
One possibly explanation could be because Windows 2000 and later ver-
sions will restore system files that were changed, but do not pass the cryp-
tographic checksum. We see this system restore behavior in Ganda, when
it targets specific Windows system files like welcome.exe (Getting Started
Screen) or osk.exe (On-Screen Keyboard).
We believe that the more current trend is to created files with names sim-
ilar to the real system files at strategic locations, rather than infecting
executable files at random.
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7.5 Early Detection versus Identification Ac-
curacy
When we extract behaviors from the malware traces, we face the problem
of early detection versus accuracy. When matching behavior functions from
blocks or macros, early detection is important for online detection while
accuracy is important for oﬄine identification. It is important for us to
consider the reasonable trade-off. We will explore some issues that affect
the consideration.
7.5.1 Blocks
For blocks, we can only accurately identify the block signature when we
encounter the NtClose system call, as seen in Figure 7.6. But for detection
of a generalized file write function, we only need to match until state
4 because the behavior of the whole block is decided by the NtWriteFile
event, the most important system call for this function.
Figure 7.6: Simplified file write9 Block FSA
7.5.2 Macros
For macros, some of the blocks may not terminate until a lot later. We
will use the search all dir recursive macro function in Bagle.at for il-
lustration.
In Figure 7.7, the first block starts at identity 6807 and ends at 33,783:
that means that we have to wait for 26,976 system calls to pass before we
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can be absolutely certain that it is a recursive directory search. (Identity

















Figure 7.7: Bagle.at search all dir recursive Macro Behavior
But for detection, we want to know as soon as possible. We can set thresh-
old for a certain depth of directory recursion as a reduced criterion. By
choosing an ad hoc depth of 3, we can reasonable say that it is a recur-
sive directory search by the time the dir search block reaches the path
“C:\WINNT\system32\config” at identity 6825.
For some behaviors, a certain amount of expert knowledge is required to
determine the reasonable trade-offs for identifying the macro behaviors.
7.6 Speed of Behavior Identification or De-
tection
One interesting piece of information we would like to find out is how fast
can we detect a malware behavior, or what is the time delay. Analysis on
this kind of information can provide more insight into malwares.
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7.6.1 Unit of Measurement: Delta Time
The first problem that we face is the unit of time measurement. By modify-
ing strace, each system call requires one API call like the NtQuerySystem-
Time to get the system time which is a 64-bit value representing the number
of 100-nanosecond intervals since January 1, 1601 (UTC). We need at least
another API call to translate the system time into a human-readable time
format. To use real time as our unit of measurement would mean each
system call captured will require at least one additional system call, which
may impact the performance severely.
As a trade-off, we use the identity counter as our unit of time measurement.
The identity is a unique number accompanying each system call event that
shows the position of the system call within the strace output sequence.
Rather than to start counting from the monitoring process, we start count-
ing from the moment the malware is activated; we call this the delta time.
7.6.2 Example: Identification of survive system reboot
Behavior
Let us take the survive system reboot behavior for our example. This
complex behavior is modeled by correlating file copy or file create,
with registry_add startup or registry_add service. The time taken
to identify the slower basic behavior is used as the identification time of
survive system reboot. The details of the speed of behavior detection
among malwares can be found in Appendix D.5.
From Figure 7.8, which summarizes the details, we can see that the Lov-
Gate family display the survive system reboot behavior fastest, at just
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Figure 7.8: survive system reboot Detection Speed in Delta Time
above delta time 600, while Lovelorn.a only show that behavior at over
delta time 26,000. The most frequent detection times are between delta
time 2000 and 3000.
While 2000 delta time might seem like a lot, we must remember that it is
the number of system calls, which can occur within seconds in real time.
We can also see that the range of detection speed among malwares is quite
large, which tells us that although these malwares share common behaviors,
the order in which these behaviors occur varies between malwares.
7.6.3 Importance of Detection Speed
It is important to study how fast our system can detect malware behav-
iors as it directly impacts the effectiveness of our future real-time system
implementation. We would like to know how urgent it is to stop certain
actions.
Based on the study of malware descriptions in Chapter 4, we find that the
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malware trend has changed significantly over the years. In the past, viruses
tend to display destructive properties, thus it is imperative to be able to
detect early. But currently, the trend is for the malwares to allow the hack-
ers to control the infected hosts as zombies, so we have to change our focus.
We acknowledge that because our behavioral approach needs the malwares
to display certain behaviors before they can be accurately detected, the
accuracy of the detection is proportional to the time delay between the
start and detection of the malware. In other words, the more accurate our
detection is, the more time we have to wait. This means that the draw-
back of our approach is that it is slower than the misuse-signature based
approach, and it cannot respond to infections as fast.
Our argument is that because of the changes in the malware behavioral
trend, we can afford to be a little slower in detecting the malwares these
days. And while our behavioral approach is inferior to the misuse-signature
based approach when it comes to detecting known malwares as the signa-





This research attempts to study the feasibility of detecting malwares based
on behaviors and forms the basis of a new behavior-based detection system.
The reason for this approach is that we believe all malwares share some
common behaviors, and malwares within the same families display more
similar behaviors.
We attempt to infer high-level behaviors from the native API system call
traces. But rather than simply using sequences of API calls to build be-
havior signatures like many others, we built semantically rich behavioral
signatures based on context provided the system call and reverse engineer-
ing based on descriptions provided by anti-virus companies. By correlating
related behavioral signatures, we were able to detect more complex behav-
ioral functions. In our behavioral analysis, we were successful in identifying
some behaviors common to all or most of our malware samples, but not to
the set of normal applications used as baseline. We were also able to ob-
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serve some interesting features of the malwares by studying the behavioral
information provided by the framework. The results we got bode well for
the feasibility of our behavior-based approach.
8.2 Further Works
While the framework has shown to be capable of detecting high level mal-
ware behaviors, there is still a lot of work to be done to improve its capa-
bilities. In fact, this research has made us aware of many other questions
that we would like to answer. We will discuss a couple of research items
that we would like to work on in the future.
8.2.1 Modifiers
Throughout the thesis, we have emphasized that we use each malware be-
havior without weightage in both detection and malware similarity analysis.
To improve the framework, we need to consider adding modifiers to the fol-
lowing items:
Risk of Behaviors : different behaviors pose different levels of risks. For ex-
ample, opening and listening a network is riskier than querying a registry
key. Modifiers should be added to the behaviors to let riskier behaviors
have more weightage.
Risk of Parameters : the different parameters of the behaviors also have
risks. For example, adding a registry key to registry paths that allow
computer programs to run at boot time is riskier than any other paths.
Modifiers should be added to reflect this information.
Similarity between Related Behaviors : when studying the similarity of mal-
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wares, related behaviors should contribute to the similarity index. For ex-
ample, if two malwares have the irc connect and http connect behaviors
respectively, these two related network-based behaviors should contribute
to the similarity index even though they are not identical.
Weightage of Correlated Behaviors in Different Processes : we need to con-
sider the situation where correlated behaviors occur in two different pro-
cesses. The processes could be related (sub-processes or LPC), or unre-
lated (code injection). Should correlated behaviors in related processes
have higher weightage than those in unrelated processes, or vice versa?
In other work involving malware behaviors [26, 52], the authors assigned
different weights to behaviors, or between behaviors, in a seemingly ad hoc
manner. We believe that we need to study the behaviors of a larger number
of malwares before we can derive the required weightages or modifiers.
8.2.2 Behavior-based System Implementation
As our current work is proof-of-concept, detection and analysis of malware
behaviors are all done off-line. We hope that the knowledge gained from
this area of research will be helpful in developing a real-time behavior-based
intrusion prevention system in the future. The current work has shown the
basic requirements for such systems, and the difficulties that will be en-
countered.
In addition, because our system monitors all system resources like files and
registry, it is possible to adapt the implementation to backtrack [25] to the
source of an unknown infection. This means the system has the potential
to recover from an intrusion and undo some damages.
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Family Variants Variant Names
Mytob 21 a, ar, au, ba, bd, be, bf, bi, bk, bt, bw,
c, h, q, r, t, u, v, w, x, y
Bagle 19 a, ah, ai, as, at, au, ay, b, ba, c, dx,
e, g, gen, i, j, s, y, z
NetSky 13 aa, af, b, c, d, m, o, q, r, t, x, y, z
Mydoom 11 a, ab, b, e, g, l, m, q, r, t, u
Mimail 8 a, c, e, f, g, h, j, q
Lentin 6 a, g, j, m, o, v
LovGate 4 a, ad, ae, w
Zafi 2 b, d
Tanatos 2 a, b
Sobig 2 a, f
Klez 2 a, h
Swen 1
BadtransII 1






0 - behavior not seen,
1 - behavior always seen,


















































































































file copy others 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
file copy System 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
file copy Windows 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
file copy share 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
file copy remote 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
file create others 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
file create System 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
file create Windows 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
file append others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
file append System 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
file append Windows 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file attrib others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file attrib System 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
file modify 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file property TIME 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file rename 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file delete 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
file execute others 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
file execute System 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0
file execute Windows 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file execute notepad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0
file execute calc 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file execute IEXPLORE 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
viii
ix
file read others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
file read System 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
file read Windows 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file access others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file access System 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file access Windows 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
file access OAB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file access WAB 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
file load System 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
ini modify win.ini 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ini modify system.ini 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
create autorun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
dir create local 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
dir create remote 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
find dir 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
find data files 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
find bin files 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
search all dir recursive 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
search specific dir recursive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
mutex check 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
event create 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
hidden msgbox 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
window box monitor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
msgbox 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
harvest emails 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
sendmail with attachment 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
sendmail 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
reply inbox email 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
/Outlook MAPI
check system date 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
check system information 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
zombie 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
code injection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
keylogger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
share enum 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
remote share mount 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
remote share activity 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
scan network 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
dns resolve 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 1
http connect 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
download inet 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
ntpdate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
irc connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
netbios connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
network connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
ping 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
xlisten port 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
registry modify shell 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
registry add others 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
registry add startup 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
registry add service 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
registry add dll component 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
registry delete restart 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
registry delete service 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
registry enum restart 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
registry enum services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
registry query others 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
registry query restart 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
registry query NameServer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
registry query SHELL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
registry query SMTP 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
registry query WAB 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
start from internet explorer 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
start from outlook 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
start from network share 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
start from windows exploits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
date activated 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
date activated payload 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
suspicious file 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
suspicious email attachment 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0























































































































registry add startup 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 22
+ file copy/file create
registry add service 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
/service create
+ file copy/file create
registry modify shell 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
+ file copy/file create
survive system reboot 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 24
Table C.1: Correlated Survive System Reboot Behavior
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search all dir recursive 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 16
+ find data files
+ harvest emails
search specific dir recursive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
+ find data files
+ harvest emails
find email addresses 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 20
Table C.2: Correlated Find Email Addresses Behaviors



















































































































search specific dir recursive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
+ find bin files
+ file modify
search all dir recursive 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
+ find bin files
+ file modify
local replication 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Table C.3: Correlated Local Replication Behaviors
Appendix D
Behavior Analysis
D.1 Malware Detected Behaviors
Legend:
0 - behavior not seen,
y - behavior seen from both descriptions and trace,























































file copy others 0 0 0 0 0 n 0 0 0 0 y
file copy System y y 0 y y 0 0 0 0 0 0
file copy Windows 0 n y 0 0 0 y 0 0 0 0
file create others 0 0 0 n n n 0 y y 0 0
file create System y y 0 y y y 0 y y y 0
file create Windows 0 0 0 0 0 0 y 0 0 0 0
find data files y y y y y y n y y y 0
search all dir recursive y y y 0 n y n y y y 0
search specific dir recursive 0 0 y y y 0 n 0 0 0 y
registry modify shell 0 0 0 y y 0 0 0 0 0 0
registry add startup y y y y y y y y y y 0
registry add service 0 0 n y y 0 0 0 0 0 y
Table D.1: Malware Detected Behaviors
xiii
xiv
D.2 Malware Detected Behaviors in Normal
Application
Legend:
0 - behavior not seen,





















































































file copy others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file copy System 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file copy Windows 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file create others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file create System 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
file create Windows 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
find data files 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
find bin files 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
search all dir recursive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
search specific dir recursive 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
registry modify shell 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
registry add startup 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
registry add service 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
registry add dll component 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table D.2: Detected Malware Behaviors in Normal Ap-
plication
xv
D.3 Detected Correlated survive system reboot
Behaviors
Legend:
0 - behavior not seen,











































































































































survive system reboot1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(registry add startup
+ file copy/file create)
survive system reboot2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(registry add service
+ file copy/file create)
survive system reboot3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(registry modify shell
+ file copy/file create)
survive system reboot4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(registry add dll component
+ file copy/file create)
survive system reboot 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(Generalized)
Table D.3: Detected Correlated survive system reboot
Behaviors
xvi
D.4 Detected Correlated find email addresses
Behaviors
Legend:
0 - behavior not seen,











































































































































find email addresses1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(search all dir recursive
+ find data files
+ file open/file read)
find email addresses2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(search specific dir recursive
+ find data files
+ file open/file read)
find email addresses 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(Generalized)
Table D.4: Detected find email addresses Behaviors
























































file copy / 230427221986530526268102232186617471706769
file create
registry add startup / 227226902014605601273892234504617351692806
registry add service












The converted malware descriptions are in a pseudo language that was cre-
ated based on the Perl language and UNIX shell scripting conventions. The
argument types are $scalar variable, @list and &stream. Any text behind
’#’ are comments. Underscored arguments like $ or $ variable represent
unknown arguments streamed from the preceding function. The symbol ‘|’
is the OR operator.
As there are some descriptions that are really unclear or ambiguous, we









TYPE: Win32 PE EXE;
COMPRESSION: PeX;
#+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++


















wingo = %System%\wingo.exe ;
file_copy $SELF, %Windows%\cjector.exe ;
#+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# scans the local fixed drives for files with the following extensions
search_loc @LOCAL_DIRS ;
find\_data\_files
*.adb | *.asp | *.cfg | *.cgi | *.dbx | *.dhtm | *.eml | *.htm | *.jsp
| *.mbx | *.mdx | *.mht | *.mmf | *.msg | *.nch | *.ods | *.oft | *.php
| *.pl | *.sht | *.shtm | *.stm | *.tbb | *.txt | *.uin | *.wab | *.wsh
| *.xls | *.xml ;
# searches for email in files with above extensions
grep $EMAIL_PATTERN @_ ;
#+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# skips email that contain
grepv @avp | @foo | @hotmail | @iana | @messagelab | @microsoft | @msn
| abuse | admin | anyone@ | bsd | bugs@ | cafee | certific | contract@
| f-secur | feste | free-av | gold-certs@ | google | help@ | icrosoft
| info@ | kasp | linux | listserv | local | news | nobody@ | noone@
| noreply | ntivi | panda | pgp | postmaster@ | rating@ | root@
| samples | sopho | spam | support | unix | update | winrar | winzip ;
#+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++






# If cannot find DNS server used by the local system
# it tries to use the one at 217.5.97.137
registry_query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\
Interfaces\*\NameServer" ; ;
if $_REG_QUERY_STATUS == FAIL ; then
unknown_process "217.5.97.137" ;
fi
# sends copies of itself to any email addresses it finds
# sends e-mail using its own SMTP engine
*sendmail @_COLLECTED_EMAILS, ATTACHMENT;
#+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# enables spread through peer-to-peer file sharing networks, such as Kazaa
NFILE1 = "ACDSee 9.exe"
| "Adobe Photoshop 9 full.exe"
| "Ahead Nero 7.exe"
| "Kaspersky Antivirus 5.0"
| "KAV 5.0"
| "Matrix 3 Revolution English Subtitles.exe"
| "Microsoft Office 2003 Crack, Working!.exe"
| "Microsoft Office XP working Crack, Keygen.exe"
| "Microsoft Windows XP, WinXP Crack, working Keygen.exe"
| "Opera 8 New!.exe"
| "Porno pics arhive, xxx.exe"
| "Porno Screensaver.scr"
| "Porno, sex, oral, anal cool, awesome!!.exe"
| "Serials.txt.exe"
| "WinAmp 5 Pro Keygen Crack Update.exe"
xxii
| "WinAmp 6 New!.exe"
| "Windown Longhorn Beta Leak.exe"
| "Windows Sourcecode update.doc.exe"
| "XXX hardcore images.exe" ;
# While searching for files with e-mail, also
# searches for folders containing "shar"
find_dir *shar* ;
# drops copies of itself in folders
file_copy "%System%\wingo.exe", @_DIR\$NFILE1 ;
#+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# opens a backdoor on TCP port 81
listen_port TCP, 81;
# installs a proxy server that can be controlled via this port
# allowing remote access to the machine
zombie ;
#+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# contains a list of 146 URLs
for URL in @URL_LIST; do
download_inet http://${URL}/g.jpg ;





if $DATE == "2006-04-25"; then





# terminates the following antivirus and security-related programs
@AV_PROG1 = "alogserv.exe | APVXDWIN.EXE | ATUPDATER.EXE | AUPDATE.EXE
| AUTODOWN.EXE | AUTOTRACE.EXE | AUTOUPDATE.EXE | Avconsol.exe
| AVENGINE.EXE | AVPUPD.EXE | Avsynmgr.exe | AVWUPD32.EXE | AVXQUAR.EXE
| bawindo.exe | blackd.exe | ccApp.exe | ccEvtMgr.exe | ccProxy.exe
| ccPxySvc.exe | CFIAUDIT.EXE | DefWatch.exe | DRWEBUPW.EXE
| ESCANH95.EXE | ESCANHNT.EXE | FIREWALL.EXE | FrameworkService.exe
| ICSSUPPNT.EXE | ICSUPP95.EXE | LUALL.EXE | LUCOMS~1.EXE | mcagent.exe
| mcshield.exe | MCUPDATE.EXE | mcvsescn.exe | mcvsrte.exe
| mcvsshld.exe | navapsvc.exe | navapw32.exe | NISUM.EXE | nopdb.exe
| NPROTECT.EXE | NUPGRADE.EXE | OUTPOST.EXE | PavFires.exe
| pavProxy.exe | pavsrv50.exe | Rtvscan.exe | RuLaunch.exe
| SAVScan.exe | SHSTAT.EXE | SNDSrvc.exe | symlcsvc.exe | UPDATE.EXE
| UpdaterUI.exe | Vshwin32.exe | VsStat.exe | VsTskMgr.exe" ;
kill_process @AV_PROG1 ;
# stop and disable Internet Connection Firewall (ICF)
service_stop "Internet Connection Firewall" ;
service_disable "Internet Connection Firewall" ;
# Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) service (the "SharedAccess" service)
service_stop "Internet Connection Sharing" ;
service_disable "Internet Connection Sharing" ;
# Security Center service ("wscsvc" - introduced in XP SP2)
service_stop "Security Center" ;
service_disable "Security Center" ;
#+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xxiii
# deletes several registry entries associated with WORM_NETSKY variants
@AV_LIST1 = "9XHtProtect | Antivirus | EasyAV | FirewallSvr | HtProtect
| ICQ Net | ICQNet | Jammer2nd | KasperskyAVEng | MsInfo
| My AV | NetDy | Norton Antivirus AV | PandaAVEngine
| service | SkynetsRevenge | Special Firewall Service





















msgbox YesNo, "File not found",
"Special-UnZip Data-Module\n\nis missing\n\nOpen with Notepad?" ;
if msgbox.response == YES ; then
# diversionary trick.
process_status %SELF% ;
FILE2 = "Converted_${_FILENAME}" ;
file_create %System%\$FILE2 ;
file_read %System%\$FILE2 ;
# contains nonsense text
file_execute "notepad.exe %System%\$FILE2" ;
fi
#+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# creates a copy of itself under a name chosen at random from list below
# For example, winrun.exe, sysrunsmss32.exe, cryptsys.exe, discwinlog, dirspool
STRING = "32 | crypt | data | diag | dir | disc | expolrer | host | log | run
| service | smss32 | spool | sys | win" ;
unknown_process $STRING ;
VKEY1 = $_ ;
VFILE1 = $_ ;
file_create %System%\$VFILE1 ;
# registered in the system registry auto-run key
registry_add "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
$VKEY1 = %System%\$VFILE1 ;
registry_add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
$VKEY1 = %System%\$VFILE1 ;
registry_add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce",
$VKEY1 = "%System%\$VFILE1 %1" ;





# contains list of email gather from the infected machine
xxv
file_create %System%\winexpoder.dats ;
# contains a list of corresponding recipient names to the email gathered
file_create %System%\winzweier.dats ;





# searches local disks for files with ext
search_loc @LOCAL_DIRS ;
find\_data\_files
*.abc | *.abd | *.abx | *.adb | *.ade | *.adp | *.adr | *.asp | *.bak
| *.bas | *.cfg | *.cgi | *.cls | *.cms | *.csv | *.ctl | *.db | *.dbx
| *.dhtm | *.doc | *.dsp | *.dsw | *.eml | *.fdb | *.frm | *.hlp
| *.imb | *.imh | *.imh | *.imm | *.inbox | *.ini | *.jsp | *.ldb
| *.ldif | *.log | *.mbx | *.mda | *.mdb | *.mde | *.mdw | *.mdx
| *.mht | *.mmf | *.msg | *.nab | *.nch | *.nfo | *.nsf | *.nws
| *.ods | *.oft | *.php | *.pl | *.pmr | *.pp | *.ppt | *.pst | *.rtf
| *.shtml | *.slk | *.sln | *.stm | *.tbb | *.txt | *.uin | *.vap
| *.vbs | *.vcf | *.wab | *.wsh | *.xhtml | *.xls | *.xml ;
#+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# discards any e-mail that contains
grepv -dav | .dial. | .kundenserver. | .ppp. | .qmail@ | .sul.t- | @arin
| @avp | @ca. | @example. | @foo. | @from. | @gmetref | @iana
| @ikarus. | @kaspers | @messagelab | @msn | @nai. | @panda | @smtp.
| @sophos | @spiegel. | @www | abuse | announce | antivir | anyone
| anywhere | bellcore. | bitdefender | clicks. | clock | detection
| domain. | emsisoft | ewido. | free-av | freeav | ftp. | gold-certs
| google | host. | icrosoft. | ipt.aol | law2 | linux | mailer-daemon
| me@ | members. | mozilla | msdn. | mustermann@ | nlpmail01. | nothing
| office | password | postmas | reciver@ | redaktion | refer. | secure
| service | smtp- | somebody | someone | spybot | sql. | subscribe
| support | t-dialin | t-ipconnect | time | track. | user@ | variabel
| verizon. | viren | virus | whatever@ | whoever@ | winrar | winzip
| www. | you@ | yourname ;
#+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# gathers email addresses from files
grep $EMAIL_PATTERN @_ ;
# stores gathered email
file_append &_, %System%\Wincheck32.dats ;
#+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# connects directly to the SMTP server to send messages
sendmail @_EMAILS ;
#+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++












# tests live connection by resolve the following URLs
dns_resolve microsoft.com ;
dns_resolve bigfoot.com ;
dns_resolve yahoo.com ;
dns_resolve t-online.de ;
#+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
